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PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS: THE 
VARYING STANDARDS 
ARTHUR D. WOLF* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the first decision of any substance announced by the United 
States Supreme Court involved a request for a preliminary injunction, 1 
the federal courts have struggled with the standards to be applied to 
such requests. While the English equity practice provided some guide-
posts in the 19th century,2 the federal courts soon began developing 
their own criteria to govern motions for interlocutory3 injunctions. In 
their quest for appropriate standards, the Supreme Court and the 
courts of appeals have not followed consistent paths through the maze 
of interlocutory relief. The federal appellate courts have not been es-
pecially attentive to Supreme Court decisions, and the High Court has 
not been especially attentive to the need for uniform criteria. 
Before examining the applicable precedents, it is important to re-
call the purpose for such relief. Historically, the federal courts, fol-
lowing the lead of their British counterparts, have identified the 
preservation of the status quo as the object of interim relief.4 That 
premise has two difficulties. First, the courts have struggled with de-
ter.mining what constitutes the status quo. Second, in many instances, 
the party moving for preliminary relief does not want the status quo 
• Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law; LL.B., 
Columbia University, 1965; A.B., Tufts University, 1962; co-author, with Mary Frances 
Derfner, of Court Awarded Attorney Fees, a three-volume treatise published in 1983 by the 
Matthew Bender Company. The author expresses his deep appreciation to Debra Dee, 
Susan Merritt, and Patricia Nowak who ably provided research assistance for this article, 
and extends a special word of thanks to Joan Moriarty for her incisive suggestions regard-
ing and diligent attention to editorial matters. 
\. Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792) (the caption in the official report 
misspelled the defendant's name as "Braislford"). The Court decided Brailsford six months 
before the celebrated case of Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DaB.) 419 (1793). 
2. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
3. Over the years, the courts have used the words "preliminary," "temporary," "in-
terlocutory," and "provisional" to describe interim injunctive relief. This article wi11 use 
these words interchangeably. 
4. See, e.g., Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton and Woolen Co., 67 U.S. (2 BL) 
545 (1863); Irwin v. Dixion, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 10 (1850). 
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preserved. On the contrary, the movant wants the judge to order the 
opposing party to take mandatory action. 
In recent years the courts have recognized the inherent problems 
in predicating interlocutory relief on maintaining the status quo. Con-
sequently, they have shifted the focus to preserving the subject matter 
of the lawsuit so that the court will be able to grant effective relief 
when the suit is resolved on the merits. While preservation of the 
subject matter is the proper concern of interim relief, the American 
legal system operates on the assumption that individuals (natural and 
corporate) are free to act as they please until they have been adjudged 
liable for injury to another. 
Interim relief is inconsistent with this basic premise because it 
restricts freedom of action without a final judgment of liability. Rec-
onciling the need for interim relief with the restriction on freedom 
which it imposes is the proper focus of the search for appropriate crite-
ria governing interlocutory injunctions. Through the years, the 
Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have explored a wide variety 
of responses to this tension. This article surveys the myriad criteria 
that the courts have developed, and urges the adoption of a model for 
interlocutory relief. 
II. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
The decisions of the Supreme Court regarding the standards for 
issuing preliminary injunctions could be described as inattentive. 
Although the Court has reviewed many orders granting or denying 
preliminary injunctions, it has not established hard and fast rules re-
garding their issuance. On the occasions when the court has ad-
dressed the criteria, it has done so casually and with little regard for 
the varying standards followed by the lower federal courts. Further-
more, the Court has not used its precedents regularly in developing 
standards. This casualness perhaps accounts for the reality that the 
lower federal courts barely give nodding recognition to the Supreme 
Court opinions regarding interlocutory injunctions. At best, the 
Supreme Court precedents serve as points of departure for federal ap-
pellate decisions which quickly move in other directions. 
A. The Formative Years 
The first case in the Supreme Court of any substance involved a 
preliminary injunction. In Georgia v. Brailsford,s Georgia invoked the 
5. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792). 
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original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to enjoin temporarily the 
execution of a money judgment previously entered by the United 
States Circuit Court6 for the District of Georgia. In that prior suit, 
Brailsford and others, who were British citizens, recovered the judg-
ment based on a debt owed them by a citizen of Georgia. 7 In 1782 
Georgia enacted a law which confiscated all debts owed to British citi-
zens, making the State the beneficiary of such obligations.8 During the 
pendency of the earlier suit between Brailsford and Spaulding, Geor-
gia sought to intervene in the Circuit Court to assert its rights under 
the confiscation law.9 When the federal judge denied the intervention 
motion, \0 Georgia instituted an original suit against Brailsford and 
others in the Supreme Court of the United States. I I 
To protect its asserted right to the money judgment pending a 
decision on the merits in the Supreme Court, Georgia moved for a 
temporary injunction to stay the proceedings in the Circuit Court and 
to restrain the marshal from paying over to the Brailsford plaintiffs 
any of the proceeds on the judgment. 12 In a 4-2 decision, \3 the Court 
granted the injunction pending disposition of the case on the merits. 14 
Because each of the justices stated his views in seriatim opinions, it is 
difficult to articulate a holding in the case. Justices Blair and IredelP5 
apparently believed that Georgia had shown a colorable title to the 
debt and sufficient injury to justify the injunction. 16 Iredell was the 
only justice among the six to use the phrase "irreparable injury." 17 
Chief Justice Jay and Justice Wilson agreed to the injunction so that 
the Court would have the opportunity to decide the case on the mer-
6. From 1789 until 1911, two federal courts had trial responsibilities: the district 
court and the circuit court, which, except for one year between 1801 and 1802, did not have 
its own judges. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 36-41 (2d ed. 1973). 
7. Id. at 405. 
8. Id. at 402-03. 
9. Id. at 404. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 405. 
12. Id. 
13. In 1792, the Court had five associate justices and the Chief Justice. 
14. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dal1.) at 406-09. 
15. Although Justice Iredel1 sat in the Circuit Court in the suit between Brailsford 
and Spaulding, he nonetheless rendered an opinion which he stated was "detached from 
every previous consideration ofthe merits of the cause." 2 U.S. (2 Da11.) at 406. Section 47 
of Title 28 arguably forbids such a practice today: "No judge shall hear or determine an 
appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him." 28 U.S.C. § 47 (1982). 
16. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Da11.) at 406-07. 
17. Id. at 406. 
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itS.IS Justices Cushing and Johnsonl9 dissented on the grounds that 
Georgia had an adequate remedy at law,20 a defense to equity suits 
mandated by Section 16 of the judiciary Act of 1789.21 
At the next term of court, the defendants moved to dissolve the 
injunction on alternative grounds: (1) the State of Georgia had no 
remedy at all; and (2) even if it did, Section 16 barred the injunction 
because of the adequacy of the legal remedy.22 With Justice Johnson 
not sitting, the Court denied the motion to dissolve.23 In a three sen-
tence opinion, Chief Justice Jay held that, even though the plaintiff 
had an adequate remedy at law, the injunction would continue because 
"the money ought to be kept [under court control] for the party to 
whom it belongs."24 He did not identify any standards to govern the 
issuance of preliminary injunctions in this or any other case. The 
Court did condition the continuance of the injunction upon Georgia 
commencing its action at law before the next term of court.2S The 
following year in 1794, the Supreme Court conducted a jury trial in 
Georgia v. Brailsford26 on the plaintiff's claim under the Georgia con-
fiscation law. When the jury returned a verdict for the defendants, the 
Court dissolved the injunction. 27 
After Brailsford, the Supreme Court said very little about the 
standards for preliminary injunctions28 until 1882, when the Court 
18. Id. at 407-09. 
19. Id. at 405, 408 (Cushing, J. & Johnson, J., dissenting). Many years later, lower 
federal courts, with or without citation, quoted or paraphrased Justice Johnson's statement 
in dissent: "In order to support a motion for an injunction, the bill should set forth a case 
of probable right, and a probable danger that the right would be defeated, without this 
special interposition of the court." Id. E.g., Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (10th 
Cir. 1980) (citing Crowther v. Seaborg, 415 F.2d 437, 439 (10th Cir. 1969)). 
20. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 405, 408. 
21. Section 16 provided that "suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the 
courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be 
had at law." 1 Stat. 73, 82 (1789). In 1948 when Congress revised the Judicial Code, it 
eliminated this provision. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 729 (2d ed. 1973). 
22. Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415 (1793). 
23. Id. at 419. In his separate opinion, Justice Blair identified apprehension that 
Brailsford, a British subject, would take the money and run (to England) as the factor 
animating the issuance of the original injunction. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 418. 
24. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 418-19. 
25. Id. at 419. 
26. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794). 
27. Id. at 5. 
28. In several cases, the Court, without discussing applicable standards, approved 
the issuance of temporary injunctions, as in Brailsford, to preserve property until an action 
at law could settle the dispute on the merits. See, e.g., King v. Hamilton, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 
311 (1830); Parker v. The Judges of the Circuit Court of Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 
561 (1827); cf Irwin v. Dixion, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 10 (1850), or to restrain execution of a 
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broke its 90 year silence. In Russell v. Fariey,29 the circuit court en-
tered a preliminary injunction to restrain the defendant from transfer-
ring goods pending the resolution of a receivership petition.30 The 
court required the plaintiff-receiver to post a security bond to protect 
the interests of the. defendant. 31 After the defendant prevailed on the 
merits, the trial court dissolved the injunction, but declined to award 
damages under the bond.32 In the course of resolving the bond issue, 
the Court in dictum commented on the criteria for issuing temporary 
injunctions. The Court noted that a federal court may order interim 
relief even if the movant's claim is legally in doubt. Where the mo-
vant's legal right is doubtful, she may still secure a temporary injunc-
tion by showing that she will suffer greater harm if the injunction is 
denied than the opposing party will suffer if it is granted. To support 
that legal proposition, the Court cited Injunctions in Equity, a popular 
treatise by William W. Kerr. Written by a British lawyer in 1871, the 
treatise largely examined English precedents, on which the Supreme 
Court relied in the 19th Century.33 
Although the statement in Russell was dictum, it appears to re-
flect accurately then current standards for preliminary injunctions. 34 
That is, if the movant could demonstrate a clear legal right, "plain and 
judgment at law pending resolution of an equitable defense. E.g., Horsburg v. Baker, 26 
U.S. (I Pet.) 232 (1828). In Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton and Woolen Co., 67 
U.S.) (2 Bl.) 545, 552 (1863), a case involving a permanent or "perpetual" injunction, the 
Court stated in dictum that the party seeking preliminary relief to preserve property pend-
ing trial of a civil action at law would have to show "a strong prima facie case of right" and 
irreparable injury. The failure of the Court to identify precisely the criteria for granting 
injunctions in such cases has continued into the present. See. e.g., United States v. First 
National City Bank, 379 U.S. 378 (1965); Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 
282 (1940). But see DeBeers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 
(1945) (no injunction if the property does not relate to the subject matter of the dispute). 
29. 105 U.S. 433 (1882). 
30. Id. at 434. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 436. 
33. W. KERR, INJUNCTIONS IN EQUITY (1871). At least as early as 1792, the 
Supreme Court by rule stated that English equity practice would guide its proceedings. 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.) 411-14. Fifty years later, Supreme Court Reporter Benjamin C. Howard 
reported that rule, in slightly different form, as having been promulgated on August 8, 
1791, 42 U.S. (I How.) xxxxiv (1842). Under the Federal Equity Rules in effect from 1822 
to 1912, the Supreme Court directed the lower federal courts to employ the "practice of the 
High Court of Chancery in England" to fill gaps in the law governing federal equity juris-
diction. See Rule 33, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) v, xii (1822); Rule 90, 42 U.S. (1 How.) xxxix, !xix 
(1842). The equity rules of 1912 did not have a comparable rule. 226 U.S. 629 (1912). In 
several decisions, the Court absorbed the principles of the English Chancery into federal 
law. E.g., Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518,563-64 
(1852); Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 222-23 (1818). 
34. J. HIGH, LAW OF INJUNCTIONS § 13 (1873); C. BEACH, INJUNCTIONS § 20 
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free from doubt,"35 the injunction would issue. In the alternative, if 
the legal right was in doubt, then the movant would have to show a 
balance of hardships in her favor. 36 The same treatise, however, also 
reflected a second alternative standard for preliminary relief: (1) a 
showing of a prima facie case; and (2) a showing of irreparable injury, 
that is, an injury which cannot be remedied with money damages. 37 
Neither Russell nor other Supreme Court precedents in the 19th ~en­
tury reflected this second alternative test for issuance of preliminary 
injunctions. 
B. The Modern Variations 
The application of the second alternative test emerged definitively 
in the early part of the 20th century in the wake of Ex parte Young. 38 
The Young decision restated the view that state officials could be sued 
to enjoin enforcement 'of state statutes without violating state sover-
eign immunity from suit in federal court embodied in the 11th amend-
ment. 39 That decision animated a number of suits challenging state 
regulatory statutes as violating the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the 14th amendment. In the wake of the Young decision, 
Congress enacted the three-judge court statute which sought to pre-
vent a single federal judge from enjoining state regulatory statutes.40 
Because decisions granting or denying preliminary injunctions were 
appealable directly to the Supreme Court, the high tribunal had nu-
merous opportunities to review the standards for interlocutory relief. 
In the Young case, as well as in the decisions following it, the 
Supreme Court held that preliminary injunctions should not issue to 
restrain the enforcement of state statutes unless the case was "reason-
ably free from doubt" and only to prevent "great and irreparable in-
jury."41 Although it appeared by the early 1920's that the Court had 
(1894); See generally Leubsdorf, The Standards for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. 
REV. 525 (1978). 
35. KERR, supra note 33, at 220. See also Phoenix R. Co. v. Geary, 239 U.S. 277 
(1915) (to enjoin preliminarily the operation of a state statute, the plaintiff must show a 
clear constitutional violation). 
36. KERR, supra note 33, at 221-22. 
37. Id. at 208. See generally Leubsdorf, supra note 34, at 530-31. 
38. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
39. Id. at 159-60. 
40. 36 Stat. 539, 557 (Section 17) (1910). 
41. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 166-67 (1908). Accord, Massachusetts State Grange 
v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525,527 (1926) (citing Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453 (1919»; see 
Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928). See a/so Mayo v. Lakeland 
Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310 (1940) (The Court in Mayo appeared to adopt two 
different sets of criteria: one would allow a preliminary injunction if the movant showed 
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settled on these standards, it still exhibited some variation in their ap-
plication. In 1923, for example, the Court, in a challenge to a state 
rate-making order, upheld a preliminary injunction because a balanc-
ing of the hardships favored the plaintiff and because the moving party 
had posted a sufficient bond.42 Similarly, in Lawrence v. St. Louis-San 
Francisco R. Co. ,43 Justice Brandeis stressed the need for the person 
seeking a preliminary injunction to restrain state action to show a 
"danger of irreparable injury."44 Without articulating in any orderly 
fashion the necessary elements for interlocutory relief, Justice Bran-
deis examined two other factors: (1) the nature of the legal issues 
raised by the moving party; and (2) the balancing of harm to the mov-
ing party as against injury to the opposing party. 4S 
Two years after the Lawrence decision, the Court appeared to 
hold that the moving party need only show a balance of hardships in 
its favor to secure a preliminary injunction, a view consistent with 
Russell v. Farley46 but inconsistent with the Ex parte Young line of 
cases. In Rice & Adams Corp. v. Lathrop,47 the Court applied this 
much less stringent standard to a case of alleged patent infringement.48 
It may be that the Court was simply applying, sub silentio, two differ-
ent sets of criteria depending on whether the case involved purely pri-
vate interests or involved a challenge to state authority.49 Within 
three weeks of the Lathrop decision, the Supreme Court had the op-
portunity to clarify the point. 
In Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway,SO the plaintiff sued to enjoin a state tax 
increase on oil production,S! another case in the Young line seeking to 
irreparable injury and raised "serious questions" regarding the constitutionality ofthe chal-
lenged statute, while the other would require "a clear and persuasive showing of unconsti-
tutionality and irreparable injury"). Id. at 318-19. 
42. Prendergast v. New York Telephone Co., 262 U.S. 43 (1923). In 1934, Congress 
enacted the Johnson Act to prevent the federal courts from unduly interfering in state rate-
making. 48 Stat. 775 (1934) (codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1982)). 
43. 274 U.S. 588 (1927). 
44. Id. at 592. 
45. Id. at 592-96. 
46. 105 U.S. 433 (1882). See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text. 
47. 278 U.S. 509 (1929). 
48. Id. at 514. 
49. The apparent tightening of standards for preliminary relief in cases involving 
government (state or federal) regulatory programs also resulted from and got entangled in 
the doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. See Myers v. Bethlehem 
Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938); see also Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft 
Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1,20-23 (1974). 
50. 279 U.S. 813 (1929) (per curiam). 
51. Id. at 813-14. In 1937, Congress enacted the Tax Injunction Act to prevent the 
federal courts from unduly interfering in state tax collection. 50 Stat. 738 (1937), codified 
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restrain unconstitutional state action. In that case, the Court reversed 
the denial of preliminary relief by a three-judge district court and 
granted the injunction. 52 Without reference to any of its prior prece-
dents, the Court adopted almost verbatim the criteria for interlocutory 
relief followed by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 53 To obtain a 
preliminary injunction, the Court in Conway held that the moving 
party must show: (1) that the questions in dispute (legal or factual) 
must be grave; (2) that, without the interim relief, she will suffer cer-
tain and irreparable injury; and (3) that, if the injunction is granted, 
the opposing party will suffer only "inconsiderable" injury. 54 The 
Court suggested that if the injury to the opposing party were more 
than "inconsiderable," the injunction could still issue if the moving 
party provided adequate indemnification with an injunction bond. 55 
But the decision in Conway in 1929 did not settle the matter. In 
succeeding years, the Court continued its meandering course through 
various tests and criteria which, singularly or in combination, could 
have formed the basis for a consistent standard for issuing preliminary 
injunctions. In 1939, for example, the Court emphasized, apparently 
for the first time, the need to evaluate the impact of a preliminary 
injunction on the public interest where the plaintiff seeks to enjoin an 
order of a federal agency. 56 That same year, in a case challenging the 
validity of a state statute, the Court identified three prerequisites for 
interlocutory relief: grave doubts as to the constitutionality of the 
in 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). See Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503 (1981); cf 
Fair Assessment In Real Estate Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 102 S. Ct. 177 (1981). 
52. Conway, 279 U.S. at 815. 
53. Id. The Court relied entirely on Love v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 185 F. 
321,331-32 (8th Cir. 1911), cert denied, 220 U.S. 618 (1911). Love, in tum, relied in part 
on Georgia v. Brailsford, supra note 5 and accompanying text, which the Supreme Court 
has rarely cited in its subsequent decisions on preliminary relief. 
54. 279 U.S. at 815. Accord, Public Service Comm'n of Wisconsin v. Wisconsin Tel-
ephone Co., 289 U.S. 67, 170-71 (1933) (applying the Conway criteria to state rate-making); 
Alabama v. United States, 279 U.S. 229, 231 (1929) (applying the Conway criteria to a suit 
to enjoin an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission). See also National Fire Ins. 
Co. of Hartford v. Thompson, 281 U.S. 331, 339 (1930) (dictum). 
55. 279 U.S. at 815. In granting the preliminary injunction, the Court also required 
the plaintiff to pay the back taxes lawfully imposed and to post an adequate bond. Id. at 
815. It also ordered the district court on remand to expedite the resolution of the case on 
the merits. Id. In other cases, the Court has approved the imposition of terms and condi-
tions, other than a bond, in orders granting preliminary injunctions. E.g., Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Engineers v. M-K-T R.R. Co., 363 U.S. 528, 534 (1960); Yakus v. United 
States, 321 U.S. 414, 441-42 (1944); Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153, 156-58 
(1939); Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 433 (1882). 
56. Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153, 157 (1939). Two years earlier, 
the Court had noted the relevance of the public interest in granting or withholding perma-
nent injunctive relief. Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40,300 U.S. 515,552 (1937). 
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statute, irreparable harm to the movant, and posting of a bond. 57 It 
did not discuss the balancing of hardships or the public interest factors 
noted in earlier cases. 
The variations continued into the war years. In Yakus v. United 
States,58 the Court noted in dictum that a district court could issue a 
preliminary injunction if the balance of hardships favored the moving 
party, and if the movant posted a bond sufficient to compensate the 
non-moving party for any harm resulting from the injunction should 
she prevail on the merits. 59 But in public interest cases, the Court 
observed, such bonds may have little utility, so courts of equity should 
carefully examine the public interest in deciding whether to grant or 
deny interim relief. 6O Thus, even if the movant establishes irreparable 
injury, the Court noted, a preliminary injunction is not a matter of 
right so the trial judge retains the discretion to deny such relief on 
other grounds. 61 Several years later when the federal government 
seized the steel mills during the Korean conflict, the Court ignored the 
public interest factor and other elements noted in earlier cases in af-
firming a grant of a preliminary injunction requiring the return of the 
mills to their owners.62 In holding that the Government had acted 
unlawfully,63 the Court simply noted that the plaintiffs had no ade-
quate remedy at law.64 
57. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 u.s. 66, 71 (1939). See also Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands 
Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310 (1940). 
58. 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
59. Id. at 440. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
63. Id. at 585-89. Contrary to the usual rule that an appellate court will not reach 
the merits of the controversy in reviewing the grant or denial of interlocutory relief, e.g., 
Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310, 317 (1940), the Court did address 
the merits in Sawyer. Its singular focus on the plaintiffs' clear right to relief is reminiscent 
of the 19th century standard for preliminary injunctions. See supra note 34 and accompa-
nying text. Furthermore, in several recent decisions, the Supreme Court, without explana-
tion, similarly reached the merits of the controversy, even though the case arose on a 
motion for preliminary relief. See, e.g., Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local 54, 
104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984); Regan v. Wald, 104 S. Ct. 3026 (1984); Firefighters Local Union 
No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984); Local No. 82 v. Crowley, 104 S. Ct. 2557 (1984); 
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984); see also O'Bannon v. Town 
Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 781 (1980) (passing reference to preliminary injunc-
tion posture of case). 
64. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585. Since the Court has regularly equated irreparable 
injury with inadequacy of a remedy at law, its holding that the steel mill owners had no 
adequate legal remedy could be seen as implicitly establishing irreparable injury. Id. at 
589. 
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C. The Current Standards 
In recent days, the Supreme Court has not done much better in 
articulating consistent standards for the issuance of preliminary in-
junctions. Between 1973 and 1975, for example, the Court discussed 
the criteria for interlocutory relief in at least four different ways. In 
Brown v. Chote,6S the Court identified a two-factor test: the moving 
party must show (1) the "possibilities" of success on the merits; and 
(2) the "possibility" of irreparable injury if the relief is denied.66 The 
following year, the Court repeated the two factor test, but phrased it 
as a "likelihood of success on the merits," and a "likelihood of irrepa-
rable injury,"67 not simply the "possibility." At its next term, the 
Court added a third factor to the test for preliminary relief, but did not 
apply it to the pending case. In addition to showing a likelihood of 
success on the merits and irreparable injury, the trial court must also 
"weigh carefully the interests on both sides. "68 In these three cases, 
the Court said nothing about the public interest. 
But in the fourth case in this span of three years, the Supreme 
Court referred to the public interest factor which it earlier had men-
tioned as an element in evaluating the need for preliminary injunc-
tions.69 In Sampson v. Murray,7o a probationary employee, who had 
been dismissed from her job with a federal agency, successfully se-
cured preliminary relief from the district court pending a hearing 
before the Civil Service Commission.71 The Court assumed the vital-
ity of and apparently adopted the four-factor test that the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit developed in Virginia Pe-
troleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC 72: (1) the moving party must make a 
strong showing of likely success on the merits; (2) the petitioner must 
demonstrate that, in the absence of the injunction, she will suffer irrep-
arable injury; (3) the movant must show that other parties interested 
in the proceeding will not be substantially harmed by the injunction; 
65. 411 U.S. 452 (1973); cf Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975), where the court 
appeared to apply the same two factors (although it phrased one as a "high" probability of 
success on the merits). 
66. Brown, 411 U.S. at 456. 
67. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 441 (1974). 
68. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 925 (1975). 
69. See. e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 441-42 (1944); Inland Steel Co. v. 
United States, 306 U.S. 153, 157 (1939); c/, Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 
U.S. 515, 552 (1937). 
70. 415 U.S. 61 (1974). 
71. Id. at 63. 
72. Id. at 83-84 n.53. 
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and (4) the public interest must be evaluated.73 Because the case in-
volved a governmental personnel decision, the Court rejected the rou-
tine application of these four factors on a motion for a preliminary 
injunction, holding that such criteria, especially irreparable injury, 
must be applied more stringently.74 
III. COURTS OF ApPEALS DECISIONS 
A. Introduction 
The courts of appeals differ widely in their approaches to prelimi-
nary relief. While there is some cross-pollination between and among 
circuits, they essentially have developed their own criteria. Their deci-
sions have largely been characterized by inconsistent articulation and 
application of standards. Currently the federal appellate courts use at 
least nine different tests, excluding variations, for interlocutory relief. 
Other than an en banc decision in the Eighth Circuit,7S no federal ap-
pellate court has convened specifically to reconcile these differences. 
Furthermore, while the federal courts have developed various criteria 
based on their common law powers, they have also recognized special 
criteria for certain statutory and constitutional claims, creating addi-
tional confusion in the search for uniform standards.76 
In addition the federal appellate courts have not been especially 
attentive to Supreme Court precedents involving interlocutory injunc-
tions. To be sure, the courts of appeals will, on occasion, cite to and 
even rely on High Court decisions, at least in part.77 Further, the 
varying standards in the lower federal courts cannot be explained sim-
73. Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921, 925 (1958) (per curiam). 
For a discussion of the current status of this precedent in the circuit of its origin, see infra 
note 84 and accompanying text. 
74. Sampson, 415 U.S. at 88-92. 
75. Dataphase Systems, Inc. v. C. L. Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981) (en 
banc). See also Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 749 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 
1984), in which the court of appeals recognized that "the relevant case law is in disarray in 
both this and other circuits." Id. at 382. Despite this recognition, the Seventh Circuit 
declined to hear the case en banco Id. at 380. 
76. See, e.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974) (federal employment matters); 
V.N.A. of Greater Tift County, Inc. v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 1020 (11th Cir. 1983) (Medicare 
reimbursement payments), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1908 (1984); Corbin V. Texaco, Inc., 690 
F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1982) (petroleum marketing practices); Deerfield Medical Center V. City 
of Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1981) (First Amendment claim); Middleton-
Keirn V. Stone, 655 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1981) (employment discrimination); Atchison, T. & 
S.F. Ry. CO. V. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (state taxation of 
railroads). In a subsequent article, the author plans to explore the special rules for prelimi-
nary relief applied in certain statutory and constitutional cases. 
77. See, infra notes 108, 109, 117, 119, 166,232,300, 371. 
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ply as different readings of applicable Supreme Court opinions, 
although that element cannot be discounted altogether. Rather they 
seem to have developed because the intermediate appellate courts be-
lieve other factors are more appropriate for the issuance of temporary 
injunctions. 
While there is widespread disagreement among the courts of ap-
peals regarding the applicable criteria, they do agree on some matters. 
First, the courts generally adhere to the proposition that the purpose 
of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo or the subject 
matter of the litigation so that the ability of the court to decide the 
case on the merits will not be diminished, impaired, eroded, or totally 
undermined. Second, they agree that a district court has wide discre-
tion to issue interlocutory injunctions, which will not be overturned 
unless the appellant demonstrates abuse of that discretion. Third, 
most courts do not apply different standards depending on whether 
the movant seeks a prohibitory or a mandatory preliminary injunction, 
although occasionally a court will draw that distinction. 78 Fourth, the 
courts have frequently characterized the authority to issue preliminary 
injunctions as an extraordinary remedy that should be "sparingly 
exercised. "79 
B. District of Columbia Circuit 80 
The Supreme Court opinions regarding preliminary injunctions 
78. See. e.g., Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1980) (mandatory injunc-
tions change, not preserve the status quo); see also Vaughn v. John C. Winston Co., 83 F.2d 
at 374 (10th Cir. 1936). But see Crowley v. Local No. 82 Furniture and Piano Moving, 679 
F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1982) (mandatory relief may be necessary to protect the status quo and 
prevent irreparable injury) rev'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 255 (1985). The objection to 
mandatory relief has not hardened in the Fourth Circuit since it has authorized mandatory 
preliminary injunctions without reference to the apparent limitation in Wetzel. See Jones v. 
Board of Governors of the Univ. of North Carolina, 704 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1983); Federal 
Leasing, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 650 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1981). The distinction 
between mandatory and prohibitory relief is frequently more linguistic than substantive. 
Courts tend to avoid any such limitations through the use of the "double negative" order: 
"The defendant is hereby enjoined from failing or refusing to remove the tool shed which 
trespasses upon plaintiffs property," or "[t]he defendant is hereby enjoined from failing or 
refusing to sell its product to the plaintiff on the same terms and conditions as it sells that 
product to plaintiffs competitors." The subject of mandatory relief upon motion for pre-
liminary injunction is sufficiently intriguing to merit separate treatment in a future article. 
79. Wetzel, 635 F.2d at 286. Accord, Massachusetts Coalition of Citizens with Disa-
bilities v. Civil Defense Agency, 649 F.2d 71, 76 n.7 (1st Cir. 1981). 
80. Congress created this court of appeals in 1893, although not expressly as a 
"circuit court of appeals." 27 Stat. 434 (1893). Subsequent acts of Congress and decisions 
of the Supreme Court recognized it as a circuit court. E.g., "Historical and Revision 
Notes" following 28 U.S.C. § 41; Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311 (1928); FTC v. 
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have exerted almost no influence on the decisions of the District of 
Columbia Circuit. Indeed the impact seems to run the other way as 
the High Court has cited with approval the leading precedent in this 
circuit, Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC.81 Prior to that 
landmark decision, the court of appeals approved a three factor ap-
proach to interlocutory relief. In Perry v. Perry,82 for example, the 
court held that the party moving for a preliminary injunction must 
satisfy three criteria: (1) probable success on the merits; (2) irrepara-
ble injury; and (3) balancing of relative harm to the parties depending 
on whether the injunction is granted or denied. 83 The court did not 
mention the public interest as a factor in the determination. 
The court added the public interest factor in Virginia Petroleum 
Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC,84 the leading case in the circuit which set the 
standards for granting preliminary injunctions. Decided in 1958, the 
panel decision, although per curiam, included two of the most re-
nowned jurists in the country, Judges Bazelon and Burger (now the 
Chief Justice). In Jobbers, the Association sought to intervene in a 
proceeding before the Federal Power Commission.85 When the Com-
mission denied the motion, the Association sought injunctive relief in 
the district court to compel the FPC to permit intervention.86 After 
the district court denied a temporary restraining order, the Associa-
tion petitioned the appellate court for relief, including a stay of the 
proceedings before the FPC.87 
In deciding the stay motion, the court of appeals articulated four 
factors to determine whether to grant the stay. The court held that 
the party seeking the stay must: (1) make a strong showing of likely 
success on the merits; (2) demonstrate irreparable injury in the sense 
that the asserted harm cannot be remedied through compensation or 
any other form of relief after a hearing on the merits; (3) prove that 
other parties interested in the proceedings will not be substantially 
harmed by the stay; and (4) show that the public interest will not be 
adversely affected.88 The "public interest," the court observed, is an 
Klesner, 274 U.S. 145 (1927). In 1948 Congress formalized that status for all purposes 
when it revised the Judicial Code. 62 Stat. 869, 870 (1948). 
81. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974) (citing Virginia Petroleum Jobbers 
Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. CiT. 1958) (per curiam)). 
82. 190 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
83. Id. at 602. 
84. 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per curiam). 
85. Id. at 923. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 925. 
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important factor in cases involving "the administration of regulatory 
statutes designed to promote the public interest."89 
Although the Jobbers decision arose in the context of an applica-
tion for a stay in the appellate court, the court of appeals has applied 
the four factor analysis to motions for interlocutory injunctions as well 
as to stays.90 Thus even though the court of appeals added the "public 
interest" factor in Jobbers, a case involving a federal regulatory 
agency, it has applied it to all other cases, including suits between pri-
vate parties.91 Indeed the court recently referred to the public interest 
factor as "a uniquely important consideration."92 But, in all candor, 
the court recognized the overlap between factors (2) and (3), irrepara-
ble injury and harm to others, and the public interest factor. "Thus, 
consideration of the public interest requires us to replay the analysis of 
the two previous factors. "93 If that is so, one wonders why the court 
does not simply eliminate it from the criteria, and return to its pre-
Jobbers three-factor analysis.94 
Since 1958, the court of appeals has adhered to the Jobbers four-
factor analysis in the wide range of cases coming before it.95 It has, 
however, "refined" the test to give it more flexibility, a trend it noted 
in other circuits. In Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commis-
sion v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 96 the court held that the party moving for 
preliminary relief need not, in all cases, make a strong showing of 
likely success on the merits.97 If the balance of equities (i.e., evaluat-
ing the other three factors) significantly favors the movant, then she 
need only present a "serious" or "substantial" question on the merits 
to obtain interim relief.98 
In short, the court held in Holiday Tours that the stronger the 
89. Id. 
90. E.g., National Ass'n of Farmworkers Organizations v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604 
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Comm'n v. Holiday Tours, Inc., 
559 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
91. E.g., Reynolds v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 102, 702 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 
1981). 
92. National Ass'n of Farmworkers Organizations v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604, 616 
(D.C. Cir. 1980). 
93. Id. 
94. E.g., Perry v. Perry, 190 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
95. "Over twenty years ago, this court articulated these four factors to be weighed by 
a court before granting a stay or a preliminary injunction. . . These factors have assisted 
analysis ever since, and we see no reason to depart from them now." National Ass'n of 
Farmworkers Organizations v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604, 613 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (Judge 
Bazelon, who sat on the panel which decided Jobbers, also wrote for the court in Marshall). 
96. 559 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
97. Id. at 843. l 
98. Id. at 843-44. Accord West Virginia Ass'n Of Community Health Centers v. 
I 
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showing on the three "equity" factors the lesser need be the showing 
regarding likely success on the merits.99 If the three equity factors 
"strongly favor" the movant, then she need not demonstrate "a math-
ematical probability" of success on the merits.IOO In later cases, the 
court has stated that the movant may obtain interlocutory relief even 
if it is not likely she will prevail on the merits so long as "a serious 
legal question" is raised and the equities strongly favor the 
injunction. 101 
In recent cases, the court of appeals has varied in its dedication to 
the criteria articulated in Jobbers and Holiday Tours. In some cases, 
the court has simply recited and applied the four factors set out in 
Jobbers, without any reference to the flexible standard announced in 
Holiday Tours. 102 In other cases, the court has noted the flexible crite-
ria of Holiday Tours, but has applied the four Jobbers factors straight 
down the line. 103 In a third category, the court has articulated and 
applied the standards of Jobbers as refined by Holiday Tours.l04 
Although the D.C. Circuit usually equates irreparable injury with in-
adequacy of "compensatory or other corrective re1ief,"105 in at least 
one case the court appeared to consider the adequacy of the legal rem-
edy apart from the irreparable injury factor of Jobbers, thus suggesting 
a fifth element. I06 
Heckler, 734 F.2d 1570 (D.C. Cir. 1984); National Ass'n of Farrnworkers Organizations v. 
Marshall, 628 F.2d 604 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
99. Holiday Tours, 559 F.2d at 843-44. 
100. ld. at 843. Accord West Virginia Ass'n of Community Health Centers v. Heck-
ler, 734 F.2d 1570, 1578 n.1O (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
101. National Ass'n of Farmworkers Organizations v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604, 616 
(D.C. Cir. 1980). 
102. E.g., Friends for All Children, Inc. v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816, 
834 (D.C. Cir. 1984); White House Vigil for the ERA Committee v. Watt, 717 F.2d 568 
(D.C. Cir. 1983); Reynolds v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 102, 702 F.2d 221 (D.C. Cir. 
1981); see N.A.A.C.P., Jefferson County Branch v. Donovan, 737 F.2d 67 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(the court recited the four factors without mention of the flexible standard, and reversed 
the grant of preliminary relief because the district judge never addressed them); FIC v. 
Weyerhauser Co., 665 F.2d 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
103. See, e.g., Ambach v. Bell, 686 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
104. E.g., McSurely v. McClellan, 697 F.2d 309 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam). 
105. Jobbers, 259 F.2d at 925. 
106. See Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
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C. First Circuit lO7 
In one of its early cases,108 the First Circuit, contrary to other 
courts of appeals, followed the decision of the Supreme Court in Ohio 
Oil Co. v. Conway.109 In Munoz v. Porto Rico Ry. Light & Power 
Co., lID the court, relying on Conway, held that the plaintiff could se-
cure preliminary relief if it raised serious questions going to the merits, 
and if the balance of hardships tipped toward the moving party. In 
addition the court stated that posting a bond would be a useful device 
to prevent injury if the harm to the nonmoving party were more than 
"inconsiderable." III By the late 1960's, however, the court had moved 
to a two factor analysis for interim relief: likelihood of success on the 
merits and immediate irreparable injury, 112 ignoring its earlier view 
expressed in Munoz. I \3 
In the 1970's, the court expanded its test for preliminary relief by 
adding two other elements: (1) a balancing of the hardships to the 
parties; 114 and (2) a public interest factor. 115 Thus by the end of 1978, 
107. Congress created this court in 1891 when it established nine circuit courts of 
appeals. 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (commonly referred to as the Evarts Act or the Circuit Court 
of Appeals Act of 1891). 
108. Munoz v. Porto Rico Ry. Light & Power Co., 83 F.2d 262 (1st Cir. 1936). 
109. 279 U.S. 813 (1929) (per curiam). For discussion of this case, see supra note 50 
and accompanying text. See also Celebrity, Inc. v. Trina, Inc., 264 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1959) 
(relying on Conway for the proposition that the moving party must show irreparable injury 
to secure a preliminary injunction); Hannan v. City of Haverhill, 120 F.2d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 
1941) (same). 
110. 83 F.2d 262 (1st Cir. 1936). 
111. Id. at 269. 
112. See. e.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 390 F.2d 113 (1st Cir. 
1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 914 (1968). Accord Interco, Inc. v. First National Bank of 
Boston, 560 F.2d 480,482 (1st Cir. 1977); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969). 
In the Automatic Radio case, the court also suggested a sliding scale approach: a "strong" 
showing of probability of success might lessen the burden on the movant to demonstrate 
irreparable injury. Id. at 116. In a footnote, the court also referred offhandedly to the 
public interest. Id. at 116 n.4. 
113. 83 F.2d 262 (1st Cir. 1936). 
114. See. e.g., SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541-42 (1st Cir. 
1976); International Ass'n of Machinist & Aerospace Workers v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 
473 F.2d 549, 553-54 (1st Cir. 1972), cerro denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972). In the SEC case, 
the court also suggested a sliding scale approach indicated in Automatic Radio without 
citing to it. 554 F.2d at 546. With regard to the balancing factor, the court has usually 
required only that the weighing of hardships favors the moving party. In at least one in-
stance, however, it has declined to allow a preliminary injunction because the movant failed 
to show that the balance "tips sufficiently" in her direction. Burgess v. Affleck, 683 F.2d 
596, 601 (1st Cir. 1982). Although the First Circuit had used a balancing test in earlier 
decisions, the court made no reference to them in these cases. 
115. Grimard V. Carlston, 567 F.2d 1171 (1st Cir. 1978). Although the First Circuit 
in recent years has generally adhered to the four criteria approach for interlocutory relief, it 
has on occasion omitted any reference to the public interest factor. E.g., Doe V. Brookline 
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the First Circuit had adopted a full blown four-factor test for interloc-
utory injunctions. I 16 But the apparent adoption of the four-factor ap-
proach in 1978 did not result in consistent application of it. In 1979, 
the First Circuit applied a three-factor analysis, relying on a Supreme 
Court case decided in 1975.117 Two years later the court restated and 
applied the four-factor approach in the leading case of Planned 
Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Bellotti. 118 Within three 
months of Bellotti, however, the First Circuit reverted momentarily to 
its earlier two-factor analysis (irreparable injury and probable success 
on the merits). 119 But within two weeks it returned to the four-factor 
analysis of Bellotti. 120 
School Committee, 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983); Rushia v. Town of Ashburnham, 701 F.2d 
7 (1st Cir. 1983); Massachusetts Ass'n of Older Americans v. Sharp, 700 F.2d 749 (1st Cir. 
1983). See also National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 608 F.2d 819 (1st Cir. 1979). 
116. Levesque v. Maine, 587 F.2d 78, 80 (1st Cir. 1978). 
117. National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 608 F.2d 819, 823-25 (lst Cir. 
1979) (citing Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975». See also Engine Specialities, 
Inc. v. Bombardier, Ltd., 454 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1972) without clearly articulating any 
standards, the court apparently applied three factors for interim relief: likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits, irreparable harm, and balance of hardships. Id. at 530-31. While rely-
ing on Doran in Burke, the court of appeals ignored Doran the previous year when it 
announced the four-factor test discussed above, and in 1981, the court read Doran as im-
posing a two-factor analysis. Maceira v. Pagan, 649 F.2d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1981). In 1983, 
however, it interpreted Doran again to require a three criteria approach. Rushia v. Town of 
Ashburnham, 701 F.2d 7, 9-10 (1st Cir. 1983). 
118. 641 F.2d 1006 (1st Cir. 1981). In fact, the court quoted from a 1979 district 
court decision which purported to recite the four elements recognized in the First Circuit. 
Id. at 1009 (quoting Women's Community Health etr., Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 
544 (D. Me. 1979). The court did not seek to synthesize or rely on its own prior decisions, 
nor those of the Supreme Court. In addition, the court made no reference to its prior 
suggestions regarding the sliding scale approach. 
119. Maceira v. Pagan, 649 F.2d 8 (lst Cir. 1981). Interestingly, in this case, the 
court cited the Doran opinion as supporting the two-factor approach, even though it had 
cited Doran two years earlier for the three-factor test in National Tank Truck. 649 F.2d at 
15. See also Doe v. Brookline School Committee, 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983) (two-factor 
analysis applied, although it may be linked to the statutory remedy involved in that case). 
120. Massachusetts Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities v. Civil Defense Agency, 
649 F.2d 71, 74-76 (1st Cir. 1981). While generally requiring the moving party to satisfy 
each of the four elements, id., the court has deviated, as the text indicates, from a strict 
application of that rule. In a recent case, it even waived proof on two of the four factors 
when the court ruled on the legal contentions of the parties, notwithstanding many prior 
statements to the contrary that the merits are not to be addressed on a motion for prelimi-
nary relief. Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d 794, 801 (1st Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 104 
S. Ct. 3026 (1984). In reversing the judgment of the First Circuit, the Supreme Court did 
not mention the unorthodox reaching of the merits on motion for an interlocutory injunc-
tion, perhaps because the Court itself has done that on occasion, see Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), despite its warnings to the contrary. E.g., Mayo 
v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310,316 (1940); see also University of Texas 
v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981). For other cases in which the Supreme Court reached 
the merits on a motion for a preliminary injunction see supra note 63. As noted in this 
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Although the court of appeals in Bellotti did not discuss any of its 
prior suggestions regarding the "sliding scale" modification of the four 
factor test, it did address that question three months later in Massa-
chusetts Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities v. Civil Defense 
Agency. 121 After reaffirming the four elements of its newly restated 
standards for interim relief,122 the court addressed the assertion that a 
sliding scale should be applied to that analysis. 123 Relying on the deci-
sion of the Fourth Circuit in the Blackwelder Furniture Co. of States-
ville, Inc. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 124 the First Circuit held that the 
irreparable injury and probability factors bear an inverse relation-
ship.12s A greater showing on one reduces the showing necessary on 
the other. In Massachusetts Coalition, the court found that the plain-
tiff had shown only a "possible" injury, necessitating an examination 
of "likelihood of success" to determine if the showing was strong 
enough to compensate for the weaker showing on irreparable injury. 126 
Despite its earlier suggestions regarding the sliding scale ap-
proach127 and despite its holding in Massachusetts Coalition, the First 
Circuit has rarely mentioned the concept since 1978. 128 Indeed in nu-
merous cases, the court has, in reviewing applications for interim re-
lief, made no reference at all to the sliding scale modification. 129 
article, 19th Century English and American practice authorized the issuance of a tempo-
rary injunction if the moving party showed a "clear title or right." See supra note 34. 
Wald and Sawyer are reminiscent of that earlier doctrine, as is American Eutectic Welding 
Alloys Sales Co., v. Rodriguez, 480 F.2d 223 (lst Cir. 1973). 
121. 649 F.2d 71, 74 (lst Cir. 1981). Although the court restated the four-factor 
analysis of Bellotti, it failed to cite that case, relying on earlier, less explicit precedents. 
122. Id. at 74. 
123. Id. at 75. 
124. 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977). For further discussion of Blackwelder, see infra 
note 205 and accompanying text. 
125. Massachusetts Coalition at 75. 
126. Id. 
127. See cases supra note 114. 
128. See Massachusetts Ass'n of Older Americans v. Sharp, 700 F.2d 749 (1st Cir. 
1983) (mentions sliding scale, but does not apply it); Auburn News Co., v. Providence 
Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273 (lst Cir. 1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982) (passing refer-
ence to sliding scale). 
129. E.g., Tremblay v. Marsh, 750 F.2d 3, 5, 7 (1st Cir. 1984); Martinez v. Rhode 
Island Housing and Mortgage Finance Corp., 738 F.2d 21 (lst Cir. 1984); Kenworth of 
Boston, Inc. v. Paccar Financial Corp., 735 F.2d 622 (1st Cir. 1984); Massachusetts v. 
Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983); LaBeau v. Spirito, 703 F.2d 639 (1st Cir. 1983); San 
Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Investment Trust of America, 701 F.2d 
1000 (1st Cir. 1983); Rushia v. Town of Ashburnham, 701 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1983); Crowley 
v. Local No. 82 Furniture and Piano Moving, 679 F.2d 978 (lst Cir. 1982) rev'd on other 
grounds, 104 S. Ct. 2557 (1984); Burgess v. Aftleck, 683 F.2d 596 (lst Cir. 1982); Massa-
chusetts Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. King, 668 F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1981); Town of 
Burlington v. Department of Education, 655 F.2d 428 (lst Cir. 1981). See also Lynch v. 
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Furthermore, in other cases, it has implicitly rejected the sliding scale 
analysis by affirming a denial of interim relief because the movant had 
failed to show either irreparable injury130 or probable success on the 
merits, 131 or both. 132 Under the sliding scale approach of Massachu-
setts Coalition, a lesser showing on one of those two factors requires 
the movant to make a greater showing on the other. If in fact in these 
cases, the movant had not met the quantitative threshold to trigger the 
sliding scale, then the court has an obligation to make that quantita-
tive analysis and tell us why the threshold has not been passed. 
While the court has not delivered a death blow to the sliding scale 
concept it brought forth in Massachusetts Coalition, it has apparently 
rendered it moribund. In several cases, the court has noted that the 
likelihood of success factor is the "crucial"133 element and "the critical 
question"134 among the four criteria.13S And in dictum, the court of 
appeals has noted that, even if the irreparable injury is "excruciatingly 
obvious," the movant must still show probability of success on the 
merits. 136 Giving greater weight to the likelihood factor means that 
no matter how strong the showing on irreparable injury, the movant 
Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504 (lst Cir. 1983) (no discussion of either the four criteria or the 
sliding scale variation). 
130. E.g., Rushia v. Town of Ashburnham, 701 F.2d 7, 10 (lst Cir. 1983) (affirmed 
denial of interlocutory injunction because movant failed to show irreparable injury); Town 
of Burlington v. Department of Education, 655 F.2d 428, 432 (1st Cir. 1981) (same); Le-
vesque v. Maine, 587 F.2d 78 (lst Cir. 1978) (same); Interco, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of 
Boston, 560 F.2d 480, 486 (1st Cir. 1977) (same). 
131. E.g., Spath v. NCAA, 728 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1984) (affirmed denial of inter-
locutory injunction because movant failed to show likelihood of ultimate success on the 
merits); McDonough v. Trustees of University System of New Hampshire, 704 F.2d 780, 
784 (1st Cir. 1983) (same); LaBeau v. Spirito, 703 F.2d 639, 642-43 (lst Cir. 1983) (same); 
Burgess v. Affieck, 683 F.2d 596, 602 (1st Cir. 1982) (same); Massachusetts Ass'n for Re-
tarded Citizens, Inc. v. King, 668 F.2d 602,607-08 (1st Cir. 1981) (same);·S.S. Kresge Co. 
v. United Factory Outlet, Inc., 598 F.2d 694, 695, 698 (1st Cir. 1979) (same); see also 
Tuxworth v. Froehlke, 449 F.2d 763, 764 (lst Cir. 1971). Indeed the court has stated that 
failure to demonstrate anyone factor precludes the issuance of preliminary relief no matter 
what the showing on the other criteria. See Massachusetts Coalition of Citizens with Disa-
bilities v. Civil Defense Agency, 649 F.2d 71, 74 (1st Cir. 1981). 
132. E.g., Kenworth of Boston, Inc. v. Paccar Financial Corp., 735 F.2d 622 (1st 
Cir. 1984). 
133. San Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Investment Trust of 
America, 701 F.2d 1000, 1003 (1st Cir. 1983). 
134. LeBeau v. Spirito, 703 F.2d 639, 643 (1st Cir. 1983). 
135. See also Auburn News Co., v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273, 277 (1st 
Cir. 1981) ("the probability-of-success component has loomed large in cases before this 
court"), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982). Accord Massachusetts Ass'n of Older Americans 
V. Sharp, 700 F.2d 749 (lst Cir. 1983). 
136. LeBeau V. Spirito, 703 F.2d 639, 642 (lst Cir. 1983) (quoting from Coalition for 
Basic Human Needs V. King, 654 F.2d 838, 841 (lst Cir. 1981) (per curiam)). 
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must still prove probability of success on the merits. But in other dic-
tim, the court of appeals has intimated that the probability factor may 
not be as important if the harm to the moving party is "particularly 
severe and disproportionate,"137 an approach that may partially resur-
rect the sliding scale formulation. 
If the matter were not complicated enough, the court of appeals 
has injected other uncertainties into the resolution of motions for tem-
porary injunctions. For example, it has treated the concept of inade-
quate remedy at law, which the Supreme Court has called the essence 
of injunctive relief in the federal courts,138 in at least three different 
ways. First, it has equated inadequacy with irreparable injury.139 
That is, the moving party must show that her remedy at law is inade-
quate in order to demonstrate irreparable injury. Ordinarily, the legal 
remedy is adequate if the injury can be compensated through money 
damages. In this sense, adequate remedy at law and irreparable injury 
are mutually exclusive concepts: the presence of one means the ab-
sence of the other. Second, the court has treated the adequacy notion 
as an independent factor in the formula for interim relief.14O In other 
words, the moving party must establish inadequacy of the legal rem-
edy in addition to the four other criteria. Finally, in some cases, the 
court has simply ignored the question whether the moving party has 
shown that her legal remedy is not adequate. 141 
D. Second Circuit142 
As with the other courts of appeals, the Second Circuit has not 
been especially deferential to the decisions of the Supreme Court in the 
area of preliminary injunctions. 143 Prior to 1953, the court of appeals 
137. Cintron-Garcia v. Romero-Barcelo, 671 F.2d I, 4 n.2 (1st Cir. 1982) (per 
curiam). 
138. E.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 84 (1974). The court has made the same 
statement regarding motions for permanent injunctions. E.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper 
Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57 (1975). 
139. E.g., Itek Corp. v. First National Bank of Boston, 730 F.2d 19, 22-23 (1st Cir. 
1984); Levesque v. Maine, 587 F.2d 78, 180 (1st Cir. 1978); Interco, Inc. v. First Nat'l 
Bank of Boston, 560 F.2d 480, 484-86 (1st Cir. 1977); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 
363 (1st Cir. 1969). 
140. E.g., Auburn News Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273, 277 (1st Cir. 
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982). 
141. E.g., San Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Investment Trust of 
America, 701 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1983); Rushia v. Town of Ashburnham, 701 F.2d 7 (1st 
Cir. 1983); Town of Burlington v. Department of Education, 655 F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 1981). 
142. Congress created this court in 1891 when it established nine circuit courts of 
appeals. 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (commonly referred to as the Evarts Act or the Circuit Court 
of Appeals Act of 1891). 
143. Indeed the Second Circuit opinions have probably generated more discussion 
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appeared to follow a two-pronged test for interlocutory relief. The 
moving party must show: (1) "reasonable certainty"144 of success on 
the merits, or a clear title or right "free from reasonable doubt"; 145 
and (2) irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted. 146 
In 1953, the court of appeals decided two cases which altered the 
standards for issuing interlocutory relief in the circuit. 147 In Hamilton 
Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 148 by far the more frequently cited of 
the two cases,149 the plaintiff sued under Section 7 of the Clayton Act 
to prevent a corporate take-over through a purchase of shares. 150 The 
plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant preliminarily from voting 
shares already acquired. 151 The district court granted the injunction, 
but required the plaintiff to post a $10,000 bond.152 On appeal, the 
Second Circuit affirmed the grant of the preliminary injunction. 153 
Relying primarily on precedents in the Sixth and Eighth Cir-
cuits,154 the court announced two criteria for interim relief: 
and more law than those of the Supreme Court. This is not to say that the Second Circuit 
has been a more influential court in the development of preliminary injunction standards 
than any other federal tribunal. Although some of its decisions have been seminal, other 
federal court cases have generated interest. For example, the decision of the D.C. Circuit 
in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per curiam) 
has had wide impact. See supra note 81 and accompanying text. 
144. Hall Signal Co. v. General Ry. Signal Co., 153 F. 907, 908 (2d Cir. 1907). 
145. Stevens v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 106 F. 771, 774 (2d Cir. 190\). 
146. E.g., United States v. Adler's Creamery, 107 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir. 1939); Hall 
Signal Co. v. General Ry. Signal Co., 153 F. 907, 909 (2d Cir. 1907); Stevens v. Missouri, 
K. & T. Ry. Co., 106 F. 771, 774 (2d Cir. 1901); cf Hadden v. Dooley, 74 F. 429 (2d Cir. 
1896). 
147. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953); All 
American Airways v. Village of Cedarhurst, 201 F.2d 273 (2d Cir. 1953). Judges Charles 
Clark and Jerome Frank sat on both panels. For additional commentary on the standards 
for interim relief in the Second Circuit since Hamilton Watch, see generally Mulligan, Fore-
word: Preliminary Injunction in the Second Circuit, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 831 (1977). 
148. 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953). 
149. Hamilton Watch literally has been cited hundreds of times in the lower federal 
courts. 
150. Hamilton Watch, 206 F.2d at 739. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. at 743. 
154. Although the dictum in Russell v. Farley, lOS U.S. 433 (1882) and 19th century 
English precedents, see supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text, support the holding in 
Hamilton Watch, the court never cited those authorities. It did cite Ohio Oil Co. v. Con-
way, 279 U.S. 813, 815 (1929) (per curiam), which has language parelleling these two fac-
tors. But Conway also imposed an irreparable injury requirement in granting interlocutory 
relief. Id. The Second Circuit never mentioned that aspect of Conway. In addition, the 
Supreme Court in Conway relied entirely on Love v. Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Ry. 
Co., 185 F. 321 (8th Cir. 1911), an Eighth Circuit decision also cited by the Second Circuit 
in Hamilton Watch. 
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(1) whether the movant has raised questions, "serious, substantial, dif-
ficult and doubtful," which present "a fair ground" for further investi-
gation and litigation; 155 and (2) whether "the balance of hardships tips 
decidedly" in favor of the moving party. 156 The court did not require 
the movant to show irreparable injury, as an independent element, 
even though prior case law l57 and the antitrust laws l58 appeared to 
require it. 
The Second Circuit defined "irreparable injury" in a quantitative 
sense, balancing the amount of the movant's harm against the amount 
of harm to the opposing party.159 Prior to Hamilton Watch, irrepara-
ble injury had been defined simply to mean whether the alleged injury 
is remediable at law, usually with money damages, not how it quan-
titatively measures against injury to the opposing party.160 Within 
two weeks of the decision in Hamilton Watch, the Second Circuit, 
without reference to that decision, held that irreparable injury, defined 
in terms of the adequacy of the legal remedy, is an essential ingredient 
of an interlocutory injunction. '61 
For the next 16 years, the court of appeals employed one test or 
the other in reviewing the grant or denial of preliminary relief. '62 No 
discernible pattern emerged to counsel lawyers and judges <Jl'r which 
test should be applied in what circumstance. In 1969, the court finally 
155. Hamilton Watch, 206 F.2d at 740. 
156. Id. In balancing the hardships, the court stated, the trial judge is to measure 
the harm to the moving party if the injunction is denied against the harm to the opposing 
party if it is granted. Id. at 743. 
157. See cases cited supra notes 143-45. In Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. 
Co., 274 U.S. 588 (1927), the Supreme Court reversed a preliminary injunction because the 
district court failed to find any "danger of irreparable injury to plaintiff which is essential to 
justify issuance of a temporary injunction." Id. at 592. 
158. Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.c. § 26 (West Supp. 1982), provides in 
relevant part, as it did in 1953, that "upon the execution of proper bond against damages 
for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing that the danger of irreparable loss 
or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may issue." 
159. 206 F.2d at 743. Factors such as the "character and extent of the emergency 
presented," "probable period of [the emergency's] duration," and "the court's tentative 
opinion on the substantive issues involved," may be considered. Id. 
160. Donovan v. Penn. Co., 199 U.S. 279, 305 (1905) (quoting Chicago Gen. Ry. Co. 
v. C. B. & Q.R., 181 III. 605, 611 (1899». 
161. Foundry Services, Inc. v. Beneflux Corp., 206 F.2d 214, 216 (1953). In this 
case, the Second Circuit reverted to its earlier two-pronged test: likely to succeed on the 
merits and irreparable injury. Id. at 215-16. 
162. Compare Societe Comptoir De L'Industrie Cotonniere Etablissements Boussac 
v. Alexander's Dept. Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962) (applied the probable success 
on the merits and irreparable injury test) with Unicon Management Corp v. Koppers Co., 
366 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1966) (applied the serious question and balance of hardships test). 
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recognized the two discrete lines of authority.163 In reconciling them, 
it simply stated that the two tests should be viewed as alternative crite-
ria for the grant or denial of interlocutory relief in every case where a 
party seeks it. 164 Seven years later, however, the court added irrepara-
ble injury to the Hamilton Watch branch of the alternative tests. 165 In 
a break from tradition, the court relied heavily on Supreme Court 
precedents which treated "irreparable injury" as the indispensable ele-
ment of injunctive relief in the federal courtS. 166 
Consequently, as of 1976, the Second Circuit articulated its test 
for interlocutory relief as alternative criteria: the moving party must 
show irreparable injury167 and either a likelihood of success on the 
merits, or sufficiently serious questions (law or fact) going to the mer-
its and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the moving 
party.168 Although some panels have used slightly different words,169 
163. Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 405 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir. 1969), cerr. 
denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969). Accord Sonesta International Hotels Corp. v. Wellington 
Associates, 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 1973); Gulf & Western Industries, Inc. v. Great 
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 692-93 (2d Cir. 1973) (while restating the alter-
native tests, the court appeared to adopt a third: probability of success on the merits and 
balancing of the equities, which include harm to the opposing parties, and injury to the 
public interest); Robert W. Stark, Jr., Inc. v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 466 F.2d 
743, 744 (2d Cir. 1972) (per curiam). 
164. Checker Motors Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 405 F.2d 319, 323 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. 
denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969). 
165. Triebwasser & Katz V. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 535 F.2d 1356, 1359 (2d Cir. 
1976). Because Triebwasser involved antitrust claims, requiring irreparable injury to secure 
interim relief does little more than recognize that the antitrust statutes command such a 
showing. 15 U.S.c. § 26. The court, however, has applied Triebwasser to non-antitrust 
cases. E.g., Sadowsky V. City of New York, 732 F.2d 312, 316 (2d Cir. 1984) (action to 
enjoin New York City apartment conversion law); Selchow & Richter Co. V. McGraw-Hill 
Book Co., 580 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1978) (action to enjoin trademark infringement); New York 
v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 550 F.2d 745, 755 (2d Cir. 1977) (action to enjoin viola-
tion of federal environmental laws). 
166. Triebwasser & Katz V. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 535 F.2d 1356, 1359 (2d Cir. 
1976). 
167. In Jackson Dairy, Inc. V. H.P. Hood & Sons, 596 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1979) (per 
curiam), the court reiterated the definition of irreparable harm set out in Benejiux: injury 
which is not adequately compensated by monetary damages. Id. at 72. Accord Sperry 
International Trade, Inc. V. Government of Israel, 670 F.2d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1982). Id. 
168. Jackson Dairy, Inc. V. H.P. Hood & Sons, 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) (per 
curiam). 
169. For example, the court variously used the words "possible," see Jackson Dairy, 
Inc. V. H.P. Hood & Sons, 596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (citing Caulfield V. 
Board of Educ., 583 F.2d 605,610 (2d Cir. 1978»; Selchow & Righter Co. V. McGraw-Hill 
Book Co., 580 F.2d 25,27 (2d Cir. 1978) Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. V. Wilmington Assoc., 
483 F.2d 247,250 (2d Cir. 1973); Societe Comptoir De L'Industrie Cotonniere Etablisse-
ments Beussac V. Alexander's Dep't Stores, Inc., 299 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1962», "prob-
able," and "not remote," see Jackson, 596 F.2d at 72 n.7 (citing New York V. Nuclear 
Regulatory Comm'n, 550 F.2d 745, 755 (2d Cir. 1977» to describe the showing necessary 
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the court has adhered to this formulationYo 
Notwithstanding the solidification of the alternative tests, the Sec-
ond Circuit has, however, made a few additional adjustments to the 
criteria for preliminary relief. First, since irreparable injury is a neces-
sary ingredient for either test, the court has indicated that judges 
should address this factor first. 171 If the moving party fails to make 
that threshold showing, then the court need not proceed any further. 
This approach has the advantage of saving judicial time. If, however, 
the court of appeals reverses on that factor, it must then either ex-
amine the other criteria without the benefit of the lower court's evalua-
tion or remand for further consideration of the other elements. 
Second, the court has broadened the definition of adequate rem-
edy to include equitable as well as legal relief,l72 thus making it more 
difficult to show irreparable injury. Thus, even if the legal remedy is 
inadequate, the opposing party can still defeat the motion for interim 
relief by showing that the movant has an adequate equitable remedy 
after a hearing on the merits. Third, the court has stated that, 
although the "public interest" is not a factor in either of the alterna-
tive tests, trial judges may take it into account in granting or denying a 
preliminary injunction.173 The court, however, has not provided fur-
ther guidance as to when this factor should or should not enter into 
the calculation for interlocutory relief. 
E. Third Circuit l74 
Like many of the other courts of appeals, the Third Circuit has 
on irreparable injury. In Jackson the court declined to attribute any significance to these 
linguistic differences, focusing instead on the essence of "irreparable injury": harm not 
adequately compensated by money damages. 596 F.2d at 72. 
170. Roso-Lino Beverage Distributors, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 749 F.2d 124, 
125 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255,260 (2d 
Cir. 1984); Sadowsky v. City of New York, 732 F.2d 312, 316 (2d Cir. 1984); Guinness & 
Sons, PLC v. Sterling Publishing Co., 732 F.2d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 1984); FMC Corp. v. 
Taiwan Tainan Giant Industrial Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Bell & 
Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42,45 (2d Cir. 1983); Sperry Interna-
tional Trade, Inc. v. Government of Israel, 670 F.2d 8, II (2d Cir. 1982). 
171. Guinness & Sons, PLC v. Sterling Publishing Co., 732 F.2d 1095, 1099 (2d Cir. 
1984); Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Mase1 Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1983). 
172. Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Mase1 Supply Co., 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983). 
173. Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exchange, Inc., 683 F.2d 704, 711-12 
(2d Cir. 1982); cf Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 261 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 
1958) (on motion for a stay of an administrative order, the court of appeals examined four 
factors, including the effect of the stay on the public interest). Id. at 830. 
174. Congress created this court in 1891 when it established nine circuit courts of 
appeals. 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (commonly referred to as the Evarts Act or the Circuit Court 
of Appeals Act of 1891). 
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not been faithful to a particular set of criteria for interim relief. The 
path through its precedents has been marked by shifts in standards 
and emphases. Its early decisions seemed to adopt a single factor: the 
moving party must demonstrate a clear case of entitlement to relief on 
the merits.175 The Third Circuit shifted the focus from establishing a 
clear case of right to irreparable injury, suggesting that the clear case 
standard applied only when the moving party relied exclusively on ex 
parte affidavits.176 To the irreparable injury criterion, it soon added a 
balancing of the harm to the movant if the injunction is denied against 
the harm to the opposing party if it is granted. 177 A few years later, 
the focus shifted again when the court articulated a two-pronged test 
comprised of irreparable injury and a reasonable probability of ulti-
mate success on the merits.178 
Apparently not satisfied with this test, the Third Circuit, without 
explanation, adopted a four-factor approach to interim relief in Nelson 
v. Miller. 179 To obtain a preliminary injunction, the moving party 
must meet the reasonable probability and irreparable injury tests of 
prior cases, plus she must also demonstrate that issuing the injunction 
will not harm other interested partiesl80 or the public interest. lSI 
175. E.g., Barker Painting Co. v. Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators, and Paper-
hangers of America, 15 F.2d 16, 18 (3d Cir. 1926); Van Camp Packing Co. v. Cruikshanks 
Bros. Co., 90 F. 814, 815 (3d Cir. 1898); Lare v. Harper & Row Bros., 86 F. 481, 483 (3d 
Cir. 1898); see New York Ambler Asbestos Mfg. Co. v. Asbestos Air-Cell Covering Co., 
102 F. 890, 891 (3d Cir. 1900) (in a diversity case, the court applied "clear case" federal 
standard to request for preliminary injunction). The single test of clear case is reminiscent 
of the 19th century English cases. See generally supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
176. Murray Hill Restaurant, Inc. v. Thirteen Twenty One Locust, 98 F.2d 578, 579 
(3d Cir. 1938). Accord Sims v. Greene, 161 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1947); Warner Bros. Pictures, 
Inc. v. Gittone, 110 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1940) (per curiam). 
177. E.g., Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co. v. Shelley Knitting Mills Co., 268 F.2d 569, 
574 (3d Cir. 1959), relying for these twin factors in part on Yak us v. United States, 321 
U.S. 414 (1944). See also Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Volks City, Inc., 348 F.2d 
659, 660 (3d Cir. 1965) (relying on Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813 (1929) (per 
curiam), supra note 50, the court applied similar standards to a request for interlocutory 
relief). In Glasco v. Hills, 558 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1977), the court of appeals held that there 
was no inconsistency between the Volks City test and the four-factor approach it had 
adopted in Nelson v. Miller, 373 F.2d 474 (2d Cir. 1967). Glasco, 558 F.2d at 182 n.t. 
178. E.g., Industrial Electronics Corp. v. Cline, 330 F.2d 480, 482-83 (3d Cir. 1964) 
(in this diversity case, the court applied both federal and state standards for an interlocu-
tory injunction). Accord Wyrough & Loser, Inc. v. Pelmor Laboratories, Inc., 376 F.2d 
543,547 (3d Cir. 1967); Ikirt v. Lee National Corp., 358 F.2d 726, 727 (3d Cir. 1966) (per 
curiam). 
179. 373 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 924 (1967). Accord Winkel-
man v. New York Stock Exchange, 445 F.2d 786, 789 (3d Cir. 1971). 
180. In some cases, the court has included harm to the non-moving party in the 
evaluation of this factor. E.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), 
vacated on other grounds, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982); The Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco 
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Notwithstanding the holding in Nelson, two weeks later the court re-
verted to its earlier two criteria analysis. 182 Thereafter the Third Cir-
cuit alternated between the two-factor and the four-factor test for 
preliminary relief. 183 
In those decisions where the court of appeals has repeated its 
four-factor test, it has not applied them in a uniform fashion. To be 
sure, the court in every case has required a showing of a reasonable 
probability of eventual success in the litigation, and that the moving 
Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying federal criteria to request for in-
terim relief in diversity case). In other instances, such harm has been excluded, raising the 
question whether injury to the non-moving party is to be considered at all in the Third 
Circuit formulation; e.g., Eli Lilly and Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 
630 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980); Constructors Ass'ns of Western 
Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Oburn v. Shapp, 521 
F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975); Delaware River Port Authority v. Transamerican Trailer Trans-
port, Inc., 501 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1974); see Kennecott v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 
1980). 
181. Nelson, 373 F.2d at 477 (quoting Crawford v. Davis, 249 F. Supp. 943 (E.D. Pa. 
1966), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 921 (1966». 
182. Wyrough & Loser, Inc. v. Pelmor Laboratories, Inc., 376 F.2d 543, 548 (3d Cir. 
1967). 
183. For cases applying the two factor approach, see Moteles v. University of Penn-
sylvania, 730 F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 179 (1984); New Jersey-
Philadelpha Presbytery of the Bible Presbyterian Church v. New Jersey State Board of 
Higher Education, 654 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1981) (one of the few cases in the courts of ap-
peals which relies on Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) for preliminary injunc-
tion standards); United States v. Pennsylvania, 533 F.2d 107 (3d Cir. 1976); Ronson Corp. 
v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 483 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1973) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 
U.S. 870 (1974); Croskey Street Concerned Citizens v. Romney, 459 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 
1972); A.L.K. Corp. v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 440 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1971) 
(applying federal criteria to request for interim relief in diversity case); National Land & 
Investment Co. v. Specter, 428 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1970); Wyrough & Loser, Inc. v. Pelmor 
Laboratories, Inc., 376 F.2d 543 (3d Cir. 1967). 
For decisions invoking the four-factor analysis, see Allegheny County Sanitary Au-
thority v. EPA, 732 F.2d 1167 (3d Cir. 1984); Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor 
Co., 731 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Arthur Treacher's Franchisee Litigation, 689 F.2d 
1137 (3d Cir. 1982); Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1982) (en ban c); 
Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 458 U.S. 
1119 (1982); Kennecott v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1980); Eli Lilly and Co. v. Premo 
Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 630 F.2d 120 (3d Cir.), cerro denied, 449 U.S. 1014 
(1980); The Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 
1980) (applying federal criteria to request for interim relief in diversity case); Fitzgerald v. 
Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d 589 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 
(1980); Constructors Ass'ns of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(per curiam); System Operations V. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 
1977); Ammond V. McGahn, 532 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1976); A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 530 
F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976); Oburn v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1975); Delaware River Port 
Authority V. Transamerican Trailer Transport, Inc., 501 F.2d 917 (3d Cir. 1974); Penn-
sylvania ex rei Creamer V. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 469 F.2d 1387 (1972) (per 
curiam); In re Penn Central Transportation Co., 457 F.2d 381 (3d Cir. 1972); Winkelman 
v. New York Stock Exchange, 445 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1971). 
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party will suffer irreparable injury if the injunction is denied. ls4 How-
ever, regarding the other two factors of injury to other interested par-
ties and harm to the public interest, the court has taken at least three 
different approaches, ranging from a compulsory to an optional in-
quiry into them. It has said that these two factors "must,"IS5 
"should,"'86 or "may"IS7 be considered in ruling on motions for inter-
locutory injunctions. 
Furthermore, the court has suggested that, in applying the four 
factors, the trial judge may use a sliding scale approach: the moving 
party need not make as great a showing on the probability of success 
factor if she makes a stronger showing on the other three factors, and 
vice versa. ISS Despite that language in several cases, the court has 
184. The central importance of the two factors is demonstrated by noting that the 
court has, on many occasions, affirmed the denial of preliminary relief simply by agreeing 
that the moving party had failed to establish one or the other of these critical elements. For 
cases in which the moving party failed to show irreparable injury, see, e.g., Kershner v. 
Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc); Ammond v. McGahn, 532 F.2d 325 
(3d Cir. 1976); A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 530 F.2d 515 (3d Cir. 1976); Pennsylvania ex rei 
Creamer v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 469 F.2d 1387 (1972) (per curiam). For cases 
in which the moving party failed to show reasonable probability of eventual success, see, 
e.g., Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor Co., 731 F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1984); System 
Operations v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir. 1977). 
185. Allegheny County Sanitary Authority v. EPA, 732 F.2d 1167, 1177 (3d Cir. 
1984); Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor Co., 731 F.2d 148, 151 (3d Cir. 1984); 
Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836, 840-41 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 
458 U.S. 1119 (1982); The Continental Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 
351, 356-58 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying federal criteria to request for interim relief in diversity 
case); Fitzgerald v. Mountain Laurel Racing, Inc., 607 F.2d 589, 6()()-01 (3d Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); Constructors Ass'n of Western Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 
573 F.2d 811, 814-15 (3d Cir. 1978) (the court employed both "must" and "should" to 
describe the obligation of the district court to examine the four factors); Ammond v. Mc-
Gahn, 532 F.2d 325, 329 (3d Cir. 1976); A.O. Smith Corp. v. FTC, 530 F.2d 515, 525 (3d 
Cir. 1976); Pennsylvania ex reI Creamer v. U.S. Department of Agriculture, 469 F.2d 1387, 
1388 n.2 (1972) (per curiam); In re Penn Central Transportation Co., 457 F.2d 381, 384-85 
(3d Cir. 1972); Winkelman v. New York Stock Exchange, 445 F.2d 786, 789 (3d Cir. 1971); 
Nelson v. Miller, 373 F.2d 474, 477 (3d Cir. 1967), cerr. denied, 387 U.S. 924 (1967). 
186. Professional Plan Examiners of N.J., Inc. v. LeFante, 750 F.2d 282, 288 (3d 
Cir. 1984); In re Arthur Treacher's Franchisee Litigation, 689 F.2d 1137, 1143 (3d Cir. 
1982); Eli Lilly and Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 630 F.2d 120, 136 (3d 
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980); Constructors Ass'n of Western Pennsylvania 
v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811, 814-15 (3d Cir. 1978) (the court employed both "must" and 
"should" to describe the obligation of the district court to examine the four factors); Sys-
tem Operations v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1141 (3d Cir. 1977); Oburn 
v. Shapp, 521 F.2d 142, 143, 152 (3d Cir. 1975); Delaware River Port Authority v. Trans-
american Trailer Transport, Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 920 (3d Cir. 1974). 
187. Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982) (en bane); Kenne-
cott v. Smith, 637 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1980). 
188. See, e.g., Eli Lilly and Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 630 
F.2d 120, 136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014 (1980); Constructors Ass'n of Western 
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held that the movant must still demonstrate a "reasonable 
probability" of ultimate success. 189 In this regard, the Third Circuit 
has expressly rejected the more generous standard of Hamilton 
Watch. l90 To confuse the matter still further, the court has not con-
sistently included harm to the opposing party in its four-factor analy-
SiS. 191 Finally, in a recent appeal from the partial grant of a motion 
for preliminary injunction, the court put aside its usual deference to 
the discretion of the trial judge in such matters, and did not even dis-
cuss the four-factor test at all. 192 Instead the Third Circuit decided 
the case on the merits because of "an unusually complete factual and 
legal presentation from which to address the important constitutional 
issues at stake."193 
F. Fourth Circuit194 
Like other courts of appeals, the Fourth Circuit appears to have 
followed a fairly straightforward approach to interlocutory relief in its 
early days. If the moving party could establish a clear right to the 
property in dispute and could show that a temporary injunction was 
necessary to prevent injury to that right, then the interim relief would 
be granted. 195 In 1932, the court decided Sinclair Refining Co. v. Mid-
land Oil Co. ,196 which one commentator marks as the fountainhead of 
the current standards in the Fourth Circuit. 197 In that case, Midland 
Oil sued to enjoin the foreclosure on certain assets because it defaulted 
Pennsylvania v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811,815 (3d Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Delaware River Port 
Authority v. Transarnerican Trailer Transport, Inc., 501 F.2d 917, 923 (1974). 
189. In re Arthur Treacher's Franchisee Litigation, 689 F.2d 1137, 1147 (3d Cir. 
1982). 
190. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953). For a 
discussion of this case, see supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text. 
191. See supra note 188. 
192. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 
283, 290 (3d Cir. 1984). 
193. Id. at 290. See also Hotel and Restaurant Employees, Loca154 v. Danziger, 709 
F.2d 815, 831 (3d Cir. 1983) (after addressing the merits and finding for the plaintiff, the 
court held that a preliminary injunction should issue), vacated and remanded sub nom. 
Brown v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees, Local 54, 104 S. Ct. 3179 (1984) (the Supreme 
Court similarly addressed the merits of the case, ignoring that it arose on motion for tem-
porary relief). 
194. Congress created this court in 1891 when it established nine circuit courts of 
appeals. 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (commonly referred to as the Evarts Act or the Circuit Court 
of Appeals Act of 1891). 
195. E.g., Ritter v. Ulman, 78 F. 222, 224 (4th Cir. 1897); see also United States 
Gramophone Co. v. Seaman, 113 F. 745, 740 (4th Cir. 1902). 
196. 55 F.2d 42 (4th Cir. 1932). 
197. Note, Civil Procedure-The Fourth Circuit's Liberal Approach to Preliminary 
Injunctions 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 103 (1978). 
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on a loan from Sinclair.198 In affirming the grant of an interlocutory 
injunction, the court appeared to announce a three-part test for such 
relief: the moving party must show a probable right, a probable dan-
ger, and a balancing of hardships favoring the movant. 199 
Although decisions deviating from Sinclair Refining dotted the 
legal landscape over the next 40 years,200 the court of appeals reaf-
firmed the essential outlines of the decisions in West Virginia High-
lands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal CO.20\ In that case, however, 
the court made important refinements in the Sinclair Refining criteria. 
First, it defined "probable right" as requiring only that the moving 
party raise "substantial issues," or that the suit not be "frivolous litiga-
tion," or that the resolution of the disputed questions not be "immedi-
ately apparent."202 Second, the court appeared to collapse the 
probable danger and balance of hardships elements into one factor: 
whether the injury to the moving party absent the injunction out-
weighs the harm to the opponent if the injunction is granted.203 Third, 
the court added a "public interest"204 factor to the formula for interim 
relief. 
Six years after Island Creek, the Fourth Circuit made further ad-
justments in the Sinclair Refining analysis. In Blackwelder Furniture 
Co. of Statesville v. Seilig Mfg. CO.205 the plaintiff sought treble dam-
ages and injunctive relief under the Clayton Act when the defendant 
terminated its dealership arrangement. 206 Pending resolution of its 
claims, the plaintiff moved for interlocutory relief to require the de-
198. Sinclair Refining Co., 55 F.2d at 43. 
199. Id. at 45. The "probable right and probable danger" language undoubtedly 
originated in Justice Johnson's dissenting opinion in Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 
402, 405 (1792), which the court did not mention. 
200. See, e.g., Singleton v. Anson County Board of Education, 387 F.2d 349 (4th Cir. 
1967) (per curiam) (no discussion of criteria for interim relief other than to note that pre-
liminary injunctions must preserve the status quo, not alter it, as the plaintiffs sought to do 
in this case); Meise1man v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 180 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1950) 
(while quoting the critical language from Sinclair Refining, the court seemed to inquire 
only whether the interlocutory injunction would preserve the status quo and prevent irrep-
arable injury to the moving party). 
20 I. 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971). 
202. Id. at 235. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 236. Although recognizing that this factor usually applies only where the 
plaintiff seeks to enjoin the enforcement of a law protecting the public interest, citing Yakus 
v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), the court nonetheless applied it to a private suit to 
enforce such a statute (in this case, the Wilderness Act of 1964). Id. In Blackwelder, infra, 
the court held that a private suit to enforce the antitrust laws advanced the public interest. 
205. 550 F.2d 189 (4th Cir. 1977). 
206. Id. at 192. 
202 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:173 
fendant to reinstate the dealership until the court decided the merits of 
the dispute.207 Applying a four-factor standard derived from a Fourth 
Circuit case involving a motion to stay enforcement of an administra-
tive order pending appeal,208 the district judge denied the request for 
interim relief. 209 
Reversing the denial of the temporary injunction, the court of ap-
peals refined still further the "balance-of-hardship"210 test it had out-
lined over 40 years earlier in Sinclair Refining.211 First, it rejected the 
application of the four-factor approach, employed for appellate stays, 
to motions for interlocutory injunctions.212 Such motions to stay 
either administrative or judicial orders, the court noted, occur after a 
tribunal (administrative agency or district court) has made a determi-
nation on the merits.213 In contrast, motions for interim relief arise 
before any decision has been made on the merits;214 consequently, a 
different standard is appropriate. Second, while rejecting a straight-
forward application of the four-factor analysis, the court held that the 
trial judge should utilize those four elements, but not by evaluating 
them independently.215 The four factors, the court noted, are "inter-
twined,"216 and should not be examined in isolation from each other. 
207. Id. 
208. Airport Commission of Forsyth County, North Carolina v. CAB, 296 F.2d 95 
(4th Cir. 1961) (per curiam). The four factors are: (I) a strong showing that the movant is 
likely to prevail on the merits; (2) proof that the movant will suffer irreparable injury if the 
injunction is denied; (3) a demonstration that other parties would not be substantially 
harmed by the injunction; and (4) an evaluation of the public interest. Id. at 96. 
209. Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 193. 
210. Id. 
211. The court noted in passing that, although the opinion in Sinclair Refining did 
not mention Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813 (1929) (per curiam) (discussed supra 
note 50), it undoubtedly was based on that Supreme Court case. Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 
194. Perhaps this is a classic example of the tendency of courts of appeals to ignore 
Supreme Court opinions on preliminary injunctions. The Fourth Circuit decided Sinclair 
Refining within three years of Conway, without any reference to it, and 40 years later the 
court said in essence it meant to rely on it. It may be appropriate to observe that the 
Blackwelder court did not make any reference to more recent Supreme Court precedents on 
interim relief, such as Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452 (1973) and Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 
422 U.S. 922 (1975), which articulated standards for interlocutory injunctions at variance 
with those announced in Conway and Blackwelder. Indeed Brown and Doran themselves 
never cited Conway. 
212. Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 193. 
213. Id. at 193-94. 
214. Id. at 194. 
215. Id. at 196. 
216. Id. The court has regularly used the term "flexible interplay" to describe the 
relationship among the four elements, id. at 196, borrowing the expression from the Second 
Circuit. Packard Instrument Co., Inc. v. ANS, Inc., 416 F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir. 1969) (per 
curiam). 
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Third, in describing the interrelationship among the four factors, 
the court in Blackwelder held that the first step is to balance the re-
spective injuries which the parties would suffer if the injunction were 
granted or denied.217 It assimilated the concept of irreparable injury 
into this balancing process, defining it as the "relative quantum and 
quality"218 of the movant's alleged injury. Fourth, if the balance of 
hardship tips toward the movant, she need not demonstrate a likeli-
hood of success on the merits. In such instances, she need only raise 
"grave or serious questions"219 of law or fact going to the merits of the 
dispute.22o 
Fifth, if, however, the injury to the movant absent the injunction 
is less compelling, then the probability of success factor plays a more 
important role.221 In short, the nature of the movant's injuries and the 
substance of her claims have an inverse relationship. A greater or 
lesser showing on one requires a correspondingly greater or lesser 
showing on the other.222 Of course, the court observed, any residual 
injury to the non-moving party may be prevented by requiring the 
moving party to post a sufficient bond. 223 
Since its decision in the Blackwelder case, the Fourth Circuit, un-
like many of its sister circuits in applying their standards for prelimi-
nary relief, has been fairly consistent in applying the "balance-of-
217. Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 195. 
218. Id. at 196 (emphasis in original). It did not discuss "irreparable injury" in the 
sense of an inadequate remedy at law. See Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 
274 U.S. 588 (1927). Indeed in some cases, the court discussed the respective injuries in 
monetary terms, e.g., North Carolina State Ports Authority v. Dart Containerline Co., 
Ltd., 592 F.2d 749, 750-51 (4th Cir. 1979), which should preclude injunctive relief. In 
other cases, however, the court appeared to discuss irreparable injury in both senses: as a 
concept addressing quantitative injury and adequacy of the legal remedy. E.g., Dan River, 
Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 283-84 (4th Cir. 1983). 
219. Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 196. 
220. Notwithstanding this aspect of the "hardships" test which requires less delving 
into the merits than the "probability of success" factor, the court of appeals, on several 
occasions, has entered deeply into the merits of the issues raised in the law suit in deciding 
whether the moving party had made the necessary showing. E.g., South Carolina ex rei. 
Tendal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874 (4th Cir. 1983); Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278 (4th 
Cir. 1983); Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1980); Maryland Undercoating Co., 
Inc. v. Payne, 603 F.2d 477 (4th Cir. 1979). In Block, the court actually decided the merits 
on an appeal from an order granting the preliminary injunction. Block, 717 F.2d at 195 
n.3. 
221. Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 196. 
222. If the balance is in equipoise, the court noted, the probability of success factor 
takes on added significance. Blackwelder, 550 F.2d at 195 n.3. 
223. Id. at 196 (citing Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 815 (1929) (per 
curiam»; see also Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433,430 (1882). See generally Note, Interloc-
utory Injunctions and the Injunction Bond, 73 HARV. L. REV. 333 (1959). 
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hardship" test. 224 Subsequent cases, however, have suggested at least 
one additional refinement. 225 Blackwelder and other cases held that, if 
the moving party demonstrates that the balance of harms tips in its 
favor, then a preliminary injunction may issue if she raises serious 
questions of law or fact going to the merits. Under those decisions, a 
mere tipping of the hardships towards the movant is sufficient to in-
voke the easier showing regarding the substance of the movant's 
claims. 
But on occasion, the court of appeals has imposed a greater bur-
den on the moving party with regard to the quantitative showing on 
the balance of hardship evaluation. In these instances, it has required 
the movant to show that its injury without the injunction "greatly out-
weighs"226 any harm to the opponent in order to invoke the lesser 
standard on the "probability of success" factor.227 That is, it is not 
enough, the court has sometimes said, simply to prove that the balance 
of hardship favors the movant; it must do so "decidedly."228 Finally, 
although the court has regularly insisted that the public interest must 
"always"229 be addressed before granting or denying an interlocutory 
224. E.g., South Carolina ex rei. Tendal v. Block, 717 F.2d 874 (4th Cir. 1983); Jones 
v. Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina, 704 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1983); 
Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983); Federal Leasing, Inc. v. Underwrit-
ers at Lloyd's, 650 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1981) (in this diversity case, the court declined to 
decide whether federal or state rules governed the granting of preliminary relief); Wetzel v. 
Edwards, 635 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1980); Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 
1979) (in this diversity case, the court applied federal standards to the request for prelimi-
nary relief without any discussion of the choice of law question); North Carolina State 
Ports Authority v. Data Containerline Co., Ltd., 592 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1979); Johnson v. 
Bergland, 586 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1978). 
225. 279 U.S. at 815. In granting the preliminary injunction, the Court also required 
the plaintiff to pay the back taxes lawfully imposed and to post an adequate bond. Id. at 
815. It also ordered the district court on remand to expedite the resolution of the case on 
the merits. Id. In other cases, the Court has approved the imposition of terms and condi-
tions, other than a bond, in orders granting preliminary injunctions. E.g., Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Engineers v. M-K-T R.R. Co., 363 U.S. 528, 534 (1960); Yak us v. United 
States, 321 U.S. 414, 441-42 (1944); Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153, 156-58 
(1939); Russell v. Farley, lOS U.S. 433, 433 (1882). 
226. Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029, 1032 (4th Cir. 1980). 
227. Id. at 1032-33. 
228. Jones v. Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina, 704 F.2d 713, 
715 (4th Cir. 1983). Accord Federal Leasing, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 650 F.2d 495 
(4th Cir. 1981) (in this diversity case, the court declined to decide whether federal or state 
interim relief standards apply since both sets of criteria are about the same); Maryland 
Undercoating Co., Inc. v. Payne, 603 F.2d 477 (4th Cir. 1979) (in this diversity case, the 
court applied federal standards to the request for preliminary relief without any discussion 
of the choice of law question). 
229. Johnson v. Bergland, 586 F.2d 993, 995 (4th Cir. 1978) (the court did not dis-
cuss the public interest factor even though it said it must always be considered). 
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injunction, it has not always done SO.230 
G. Fifth Circuit 231 
While earlier cases232 suggested other standards for issuing pre-
liminary injunctions, in recent years the Fifth Circuit has articulated a 
four-factor analysis for interim relief. The leading precedent is Canal 
Authority of State of Florida v. Callaway,233 although three cases de-
cided a few years before contain the four elements.234 In Canal Au-
thority, Florida secured a temporary injunction to prevent the 
defendant Secretary of the Army from, in effect, abandoning a water-
shed project, which President Nixon had ordered stopped for environ-
mental reasons. 235 After the district court denied the defendant's 
motion to modify the preliminary injunction, the Secretary 
appealed.236 
In discussing the criteria for the issuance of temporary relief, the . 
court of appeals identified four elements, each of which must be 
demonstrated by the moving party: (1) substantial likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits; (2) "a substantial threat that the movant will suffer 
irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted"; (3) the threatened 
injury to the moving party if the injunction is denied outweighs the 
harm to the opposing party if it is granted;237 and (4) the public inter-
230. E.g., Jones v. Board of Governors of the University of North Carolina, 704 F.2d 
713 (4th Cir. 1983) (the court noted the public interest factor, but did not discuss it); Dan 
River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983) (same); Maryland Undercoating Co., Inc. 
v. Payne, 603 F.2d 477 (4th Cir. 1979) (same); North Carolina State Ports Authority v. 
Data Containerline Co., Ltd., 592 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1979) (same). See also Federal Leas-
ing, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 650 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1981) (court did not mention 
public interest factor). In some but not all of these cases, the court held that interlocutory 
injunctive relief was inappropriate. Thus it may be that judges are not required to address 
the public interest factor if the other conditions for interim relief are not satisfied. 
231. Congress created this court in 1891 when it established nine circuit courts of 
appeals. 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (commonly referred to as the Evarts Act or the Circuit Court 
of Appeals Act of 1891). 
232. See, e.g., Community Natural Gas Co. v. City of Cisco, 65 F.2d 320, 321 (5th 
Cir. 1933) (a preliminary injunction will issue "to maintain the status quo or [if] it is clearly 
shown that irreparable injury is imminent"). In Calagaz v. DeFries, 303 F.2d 588, 589-90 
(5th Cir. 1962) (per curiam) and City of Miami Beach v. Benhow Realty, 168 F.2d 378, 380 
(5th Cir. 1948), the court of appeals followed the test outlined in Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 
279 U.S. 813 (1929) (per curiam), which then faded into oblivion in the Fifth Circuit. 
233. 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1974). 
234. Blackshear Residents Organization v. Romney, 472 F.2d 1197 (5th Cir. 1973) 
(per curiam); Allison v. Froehlke, 470 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1972); Bayless v. Martine, 430 
F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972). 
235. Canal Authority, 489 F.2d at 570. 
236. Id. at 572. 
237. In weighing the relative harm to the parties, the court may consider the impact 
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est will not be disserved by the granting of the injunction.238 After 
firmly identifying these considerations and placing the burden of per-
suasion on the moving party, the court noted that factors (1) and (3) 
could be considered on a "sliding scale."239 That is, the movant may 
make a lesser showing on the substantial likelihood element if she 
makes a stronger showing on the balancing of harms, and vice versa. 
In the years following Canal Authority, the Fifth Circuit has reit-
erated the four-factor approach on many occasions.240 While in nearly 
every subsequent case the court has discussed these four elements as 
the exclusive factors, in one case the Fifth Circuit held that the Canal 
Authority analysis does not exclude other considerations; the four ele-
ments merely represented "the minimal factors" which the trial judge 
must address before ordering preliminary relief.241 Further, in another 
aberrational decision, the court held that the moving party need not 
make as strong a showing on the four factors if she seeks only to pre-
serve property or the subject matter of the law suit pending a decision 
on the merits as compared to a preliminary injunction to require af-
firmative action. 242 
Regarding the "sliding scale" variation, the court has exhibited 
some inconsistencies in its application. First, it should be noted that 
the Fifth Circuit solidified the "sliding scale" analysis in Texas v. Sea-
train,243 but cautioned that the moving party must make some show-
ing on the merits, even though it need not be substantial,244 If the 
moving party has no chance of succeeding on the merits, the trial 
of requiring the moving party to post an injunction bond, which has the effect of protecting 
the opponent from permanent injury. Camenisch v. University of Texas, 616 F.2d 127, 130 
(5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 451 U.S. 390 (1981); see Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 
433 (1881); see generally Note, Interlocutory Injunctions and the Injunction Bond, 73 
HARV. L. REv. 333 (1959). Arguably posting of a bond could protect the losing party 
from interim damage in most cases. The Fifth Circuit, however, has not made much of this 
aspect of Camenisch, although the Supreme Court made the same point in Ohio Oil Co. v. 
Conway, 279 U.S. 813,815 (1929) (per curiam). 
238. Canal Authority, 489 F.2d at 572. 
239. Id. at 576. While the court briefly discussed the concept in Canal Authority, the 
phrase "sliding scale" first appeared in Siff v. State Democratic Executive Committee, 500 
F.2d 1307, 1309 (5th Cir. 1974), decided six months after Canal Authority. 
240. E.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. UGI Corp., 731 F.2d 1186, 1190-91 (5th Cir. 
1984); Apple Barrel Productions, Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 386 (5th Cir. 1984); City of 
Meridian v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 721 F.2d 525, 527 (5th Cir. 1983). 
241. Florida Medical Ass'n, Inc. v. HEW, 601 F.2d 199, 203 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979). 
242. Compact Van Equipment Co., v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., 566 F.2d 952, 954 (5th 
Cir. 1978) (lesser showing for "a protective preliminary injunction"). 
243. 518 F.2d 175, 180 (5th Cir. 1975). 
244. Id. Accord Productos Carnic, S.A. v. Central American Beef and Seafood Trad-
ing Co., 621 F.2d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 1980) (need only show "some" likelihood of success on 
the merits). 
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judge cannot issue a preliminary injunction no matter how strong the 
showing on the hardship factor.245 
Second, the court in Seatrain strongly suggested that the trial 
court should avoid inquiring too deeply into the merits, especially if 
primary jurisdiction and agency expertise are involved in the case. 246 
However, it should be recalled that Canal Authority identified the first 
factor as a "substantial" likelihood of success, a standard which inevi-
tably leads to a significant inquiry into the merits.247 Thus there is 
some tension between Seatrain. and Canal Authority. Several years 
later the court attempted to deal with that tension in reminding the 
district judges not to look into the merits of the controversy in deter-
mining whether to order preliminary relief. 248 At the same time, the 
Fifth Circuit noted that under Canal Authority, the "merits of the case 
are an important factor" and "deserve extensive discussion."249 
Third, having failed to remove this tension in its precedents,250 
the subsequent Fifth Circuit decisions have followed a sinuous path. 
In several cases, the court has decided preliminary injunction cases 
without any reference to the sliding scale variation. In such instances, 
it has evaluated the movant's showing on probability of success with-
out discussing the alternative analysis. 251 Indeed in some cases the 
court summarily affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction having 
agreed that the moving party failed to demonstrate a substantiallikeli-
hood of success on the merits.252 Moreover, in a few instances, it ap-
pears the appellate court actually decided the merits.253 In other 
245. Seatrain, 518 F.2d at 180. 
246. Id. 
247. Canal Authority, 489 F.2d at 572. 
248. Piedmont Heights Civil Club, Inc. v. Moreland, 637 F.2d 430, 435 n.6 (5th Cir. 
1981). 
249. Id. 
250. Some courts of appeals, such as the Eighth Circuit, have encouraged the use of 
a "sliding scale" analysis so that the district judges will not inquire too deeply into the 
merits. See infra text accompanying notes 348-69. 
251. E.g., Interox America v. PPG Industries, Inc. 736 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1984) (in 
this apparent diversity case, the court did not discuss the question whether federal or state 
standards for preliminary relief should apply); Union Carbide Corp. v. UGI Corp., 731 
F.2d 1186 (5th Cir. 1984); City of Meridian v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 721 F.2d 525 (5th Cir. 
1983); Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Neal, 669 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1982); Foley v. Ala-
bama State Bar, 648 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1981); City of Atlanta v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rap. 
Trans. Auth., 636 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1981); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. 
Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979); Vision Center v. Opticks, Inc., 596 
F.2d III (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016 (1980). 
252. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co. v. Neal, 669 F.2d 300,308 (5th Cir. 1982); City of 
Atlanta v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rap. Trans. Auth., 636 F.2d 1084, 1094 (5th Cir. 1981). 
253. E.g., City of Meridian v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 721 F.2d 525, 527 (5th Cir. 
1983); Van Arsdel v. Texas A & M University, 628 F.2d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1980). 
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cases, the court of appeals has discussed or applied the sliding scale 
alternative.254 
H. Sixth Circuit 255 
In the early cases,256 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted 
p. three-pronged test for preliminary relief. For example, in Blount v. 
Societe Anonyme Du Filtre Chamberland Systeme Pasteur,257 a leading 
early precedent, the court held that the moving party must show: (1) a 
clear title or right, or one reasonably free from doubt; (2) that the 
opponent's acts or threatened acts will seriously or irreparably harm 
the movant's rights; and (3) that the injury to the moving party will be 
"certain and great" if the injunction is denied, while the injury to the 
opponent will be "slight or inconsiderable" if the injunction is 
granted.258 
With respect to the first factor, "clear title," the Sixth Circuit 
held that demonstrating a "probable right" would satisfy the ele-
ment.259 While the court noted that the English precedents required a 
lesser showing (i. e., the plaintiff need only raise a "fair question" and 
show that the balance of "inconveniences" favors her),260 the Sixth 
Circuit opted for the more stringent test. 261 The court quickly added 
the requirement of an injunction bond.262 By 1922, the court had 
254. E.g .. , Productos Carnic, S.A. v. Central American Beef and Seafood Trading 
Co., 621 F.2d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 1980); Florida Medical Ass'n, v. HEW, 601 F.2d 199,202-
03 (5th Cir. 1979). In Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. East Baton Rouge Parish School 
Board, 578 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1978), the court held that, under the sliding scale 
analysis, a preliminary injunction may issue where one or more (not simply the probability 
or hardship factor) of the four elements are "very strongly established," even though the 
moving party has made a weaker showing on the remaining factor or factors. This case 
represents a unique variation on the sliding scale analysis. 
255. Congress created this court in 1891 when it established nine circuit courts of 
appeals. 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (commonly referred to as the Evarts Act or the Circuit Court 
of Appeals Act of 1891). 
256. E.g., Blount v. Societe Anonyme Du Filtre Chamberland Systeme Pasteur, 53 
F. 98 (5th Cir. 1892) (Judges Jackson and Taft, two future members of the Supreme Court, 
sat on the panel). Accord City of Grand Rapids v. Warren Bros. Co., 196 F. 892 (6th Cir. 
1912). 
257. 53 F. 98 (6th Cir. 1892). 
258. Id. at 101. 
259. Id. The court drew the "probable right" language from Justice Johnson's dis-
senting opinion in Georgia v. Brailsford, discussed supra note 5. Id. 
260. Id. (quoting The Shrewsbury and Chester v. The Shrewsbury and Birmingham 
Ry. Co., 61 Eng. Rep. 159 (1851». 
261. Id. at 105. 
262. E.g., Grand Rapids v. Warren Bros. Co., 196 F. 892, 899 (6th Cir. 1912). Ac-
cord Fordson Coal Co. v. Maggard, 2 F.2d 708 (6th Cir. 1924); City of Louisville v. Louis-
ville Home Telephone Co., 279 F. 949, 956 (6th Cir. 1922). Section 18 of the Clayton Act 
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modified and reduced the test so that a movant need only demonstrate: 
(1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) a balance of 
the equities favoring the movant (weighing the harm to each party if 
an injunction is granted or denied); and (3) irreparable injury.263 
For the next 50 years, the Sixth Circuit generally followed the 
three-pronged test for the grant of interlocutory relief. 264 In 1972, 
without reference to its early pecedents, the Sixth Circuit reformulated 
the standards for interlocutory relief. In North Avondale Neighbor-
hood Ass'n v. Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority,265 the plain-
tiffs sought to enjoin the construction of a housing project in a black 
residential area as violating the federal Fair Housing Act.266 In af-
firming the denial of a preliminary injunction, the court of appeals 
outlined four factors to determine the propriety of interlocutory relief. 
The trial judge, the court held, is to determine: (1) whether the 
movant has made a strong showing of probable success on the merits; 
(2) whether the moving party will suffer irreparable injury if the in-
junction is denied; (3) whether the issuance of the injunction will visit 
substantial harm on others; and (4) whether the injunction will serve 
the public interest.267 In articulating these factors, the court relied on 
two decisions268 addressing the criteria for stays of federal administra-
tive agency orders pending appeal, without any discussion of why the 
standards for stays and preliminary relief should be the same. These 
criteria differed from earlier standards (not cited in the opinion) in two 
respects: (1) the movant must make a "strong" showing of likely suc-
cess on the merits, not simply a "reasonable" probability of success;269 
and (2) the public interest is added as a factor. 
of 1914 appeared to require the posting of a bond as a condition for the issuance of a 
temporary restraining order or an interlocutory injunction. 38 Stat. 730, 738 (1914). 
263. City of Louisville v. Louisville Home Telephone Co., 279 F. 949, 956 (6th Cir. 
1922). 
264. E.g., Garlock, Inc. v. United Seal Inc., 404 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1968) (per 
curiam); Set-O-Type Co. v. American Multigraph Co., 55 F.2d 800 (6th Cir. 1932); Inter-
state Transit v. City of Detroit, Mich., 46 F.2d 42 (6th Cir. 1931). 
265. 464 F.2d 486 (6th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). 
266. Id. at 487. 
267. Id. at 488. 
268. Id. Hamlin Testing Laboratories, Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm., 337 F.2d 
221 (6th Cir. 1964); Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Federal Power Comm., 259 F.2d 
921 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per curiam). In Hamlin, the Sixth Circuit relied entirely on Jobbers. 
269. Five years later, in Mason County Medical Ass'n v. Knebel, 563 F.2d 256 (6th 
Cir. 1977), the court rejected, as "unfortunate terminology," language in other cases which 
permitted the movant to prevail simply by showing a "possibility of success on the merits." 
Id. at 261 n.4. The test, the court emphasized, is "a strong or substantial likelihood or 
probability of success." Id. (emphases in original). Five years after Knebel, the court ap-
peared to regress, employing the phrase "a strong possibility of success on the merits." 
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Despite the general adherence by the Sixth Circuit first to the 
three-pronged and then the four-pronged tests, the court has deviated 
from these basic models. In 1954, for example, the court seemed to 
announce alternative criteria for the issuance of a preliminary injunc-
tion. In American Federation of Musicians v. Stein,270 the plaintiff 
Stein sued to enjoin the Federation from keeping his name on an "un-
fair" list which the defendant circulated among musicians.271 In af-
firming the grant of interim relief, the court, relying on the Blount 
case,272 held that a party seeking a preliminary injunction need only 
raise questions that are grave and difficult (here jurisdictional issues) 
and show that balancing the harms favors the movant.273 Although 
the court of appeals seemed to rely on Stein in a few subsequent 
cases,274 the decision never generated a distinct line of authority as 
Hamilton Watch 275 did in the Second Circuit. 
After reformulating the criteria for interim relief in North 
Avondale, the court returned to a Stein-type analysis without reference 
to Stein. In Roth v. Bank of the Commonwealth,276 the plaintiffs se-
cured a preliminary injunction to prevent the defendants from pursu-
ing related litigation in other federal courtS.277 In affirming the order 
below, the Sixth Circuit reiterated the applicability of the four-pro-
nged test,278 but added the two-factor test of Hamilton Watch 279 as an 
alternative basis upon which to obtain interim relief.280 Under Hamil-
ton Watch, it may be recalled, the movant need only show she has 
raised serious questions going to the merits, and that the balance of 
hardships tips decidedly in her favor. 281 The court suggested that the 
two tests may in reality be a sliding scale in that the probability of 
Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 541, 560 (6th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds sub 
nom. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 104 S. Ct. 2576 (1984). 
270. 213 F.2d 679 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 873 (1954). 
271. Id. at 681. 
272. Blount v. Societe Anonyme Du Filtre Chamberland Systeme Pasteur, 53 F. 98 
(6th Cir. 1892). 
273. American Federation 0/ Musicians, 213 F.2d at 683. At one point in the opin-
ion, the court phrases the balancing element as requiring the plaintiff to show substantial 
and irreparable injury as against inconsiderable harm to the opposing party. Id. 
274. See, e.g., Brandeis Machinery & Supply Corp. v. Barber-Greene Co., 503 F.2d 
503 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). 
275. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
276. 583 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 422 U.S. 925 (1979). 
277. Id. at 529. 
278. Id. at 537-38. 
279. See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
280. Roth, 583 F.2d at 536-37. 
281. Hamilton Watch, 206 F.2d at 101. 
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success has an inverse relationship to the balance of hardships.282 It 
also suggested that the easier test of Hamilton Watch is appropriate in 
cases like Roth which seek only to enjoin other federal courts from 
proceeding.283 
Again, as with Stein, the Roth case did not generate much of an 
independent line of authority. In 1982, when a district court allowed a 
preliminary injunction without a showing of irreparable injury (which 
both Stein and Hamilton Watch allow), the court of appeals reversed 
the decision. In Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Michigan Buick, Inc. ,284 
the court held that proof of irreparable injury is an indispensable ele-
ment to secure interlocutory relief, citing several Supreme Court 
cases.285 In reconciling the four-factor analysis with Roth, the court 
stated that irreparable injury is built into the balance of hardships as-
pect of Roth and that its alternative test approach merely underscores 
the flexible nature of the criteria for preliminary relief.286 In other 
words, the court held, Roth simply allows a moving party to make a 
lesser showing on the probability of success factor if she makes a 
greater showing on the balance of hardships criterion, and vice versa. 
In this sense, the Sixth Circuit approach is similar to that currently 
followed in the Fifth Circuit.287 
The Sixth Circuit has made no reference to Roth or Friendship in 
many subsequent cases, but has simply recited the four criteria set out 
in North Avondale.288 The district courts in the circuit have also 
tended to ignore the "alternative" test for preliminary relief.289 More-
over, in Warner v. Central Trust Co. ,290 the court of appeals expressly 
stated that it had not adopted any '!alternative" test as such, agam 
282. Roth, 583 F.2d at 537-38. 
283. Id. at 536-37. 
284. 679 F.2d 100 (6th Cir. 1982). 
285. Id. at 102-03. 
286. Id. at 104. 
287. See supra note 239 and accompanying text. 
288. See, e.g., Roe by Doe v. Ashtabula County Mental Health Board, 726 F.2d 270, 
271 (6th Cir. 1984); American Motors Sales Corp. v. Runke, 708 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 
1983); Usaco Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy, Inc., 689 F.2d 94, 98 (6th Cir. 1982); Martin-
Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 564-65 (6th Cir. 1982). 
289. See Bossert v. Springfield Group, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 56 (S.D. Ohio 1984); Tur-
ner v. Heckler, 573 F. Supp. 867 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Cobb v. Green, 574 F. Supp. 256 (W.D. 
Mich. 1983); Nintendo of America, Inc. v. E1con Industries, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. 
Mich. 1982); Project Vote! v. Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, 578 F. Supp. 7 (S.D. 
Ohio 1982); Putrus v. Montgomery, 555 F. Supp. 452 (E.D. Mich. 1982). But see Hart v. 
Ferris State College, 557 F. Supp. 1379, 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (discusses "alternative" 
test of Friendship). 
290. 715 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 1983). 
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without making any reference to or discussion of the Stein decision.291 
The court stressed the language in Friendship which focused on the 
flexible nature of the criteria for preliminary relief.292 Finally, in a 
recent case, the court suggested that, apart from their flexibility, the 
four factors should not be viewed as comprehensive.293 
I. Seventh Circuit 294 
In its early cases, the Seventh Circuit principally followed the 
lead of the Eighth Circuit in formulating the standards for the issu-
ance of preliminary injunctions. It held that the moving party must 
satisfy two criteria: (1) the questions oflaw or fact to be decided in the 
case are grave and difficult; and (2) the movant will suffer great or 
irreparable harm if the injunction is denied while the opponent will 
suffer negligibly if it is granted.295 Even if the harm to the opposing 
party is more than insignificant, the injunction may still issue if a bond 
can protect the opponent's interests.296 
This two-part test soon evolved into a three-pronged standard: 
(1) reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (2) inadequate legal 
remedy and irreparable injury;297 and (3) the balance of hardships tilts 
291. Id. at 1123. It is also difficult to reconcile this statement in Warner with the 
holding in Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642 
(6th Cir.), cerro denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982). In this trademark infringement case, the Sixth 
Circuit expressly adopted the two-pronged alternative test current in the Second Circuit. 
Id. at 651. See discussion, supra note 147 and accompanying text. Like Stein and Roth 
before it, however, the Frisch's decision has not generated any line of authority in the Sixth 
Circuit, other than a few district court trademark cases. In his next article, the author will 
examine the standards for preliminary relief in cases involving certain statutory and consti-
tutional claims. Perhaps the Frisch's opinion should be numbered among those precedents, 
although nothing in the decision so indicates. 
292. Warner, 715 F.2d at 1123. 
293. Tate v. Frey, 735 F.2d 986, 990 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). 
294. Congress created this court in 1891 when it established nine circuit courts of 
appeals. 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (commonly referred to as the Evarts Act or the Circuit Court 
of Appeals Act of 1891). 
295. See, e.g., Doeskin Products, Inc. v. United Paper Co., 195 F.2d 356, 358-59 (7th 
Cir. 1952); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 188 F.2d 
302, 306 (7th Cir. 1951); Selchow & Richter Co. v. Western Printing and Lithographing 
Co., 112 F.2d 430,431-32 (7th Cir. 1940) (in Selchow, the court relied on Ohio Oil Co. v. 
Conway, 279 U.S. 813 (1929) (per curiam), which in tum had relied exclusively on the Love 
decision in the Eighth Circuit). 
296 .. See, e.g., Doeskin Products, Inc. v. United Paper Co., 195 F.2d 356, 358 (7th 
Cir. 1952). 
297. In Nuclear-Chicago Corp. v. Nuclear Data, Inc., 465 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1972), 
the court, discussing irreparable injury" stated "the traditional rule that a defendant's abil-
ity to compensate plaintiff in money damages precludes issuance of a preliminary injunc-
tion." Id. at 430. 
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towards the moving party.298 On at least two occasions, separated by 
30 years, the court suggested that the district courts could employ the 
alternative test applied in other circuits for interim relief: (1) the mo-
vant has raised serious questions which present a fair ground for litiga-
tion; and (2) a balance of hardships which tips decidedly towards the 
movant.299 Within seven months of the last suggestion, however, the 
court of appeals rejected this alternative standard because it did not 
require any showing of irreparable injury, which the court held was an 
indispensable element for interlocutory reliepoo 
In 1976, the court of appeals decided Fox Valley Harvestore, Inc. 
v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc.,30l a leading precedent in the 
circuit. In this case, the plaintiffs challenged, on various state and fed-
eral grounds, the defendant's termination of its dealership franchise.302 
In affirming the denial of an interlocutory injunction, the court out-
lined the factors to be evaluated in determining the propriety of a re-
quest for interim relief. It recited the three-pronged standard 
discussed above,303 and then added a fourth factor: that "the granting 
of a preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest. "304 
The court offered no explanation for the addition of this fourth ele-
ment other than a citation to a Fifth Circuit decision so holding. 305 
The court has reaffirmed Fox Valley in subsequent cases. 306 
It should be noted that in Fox Valley the Seventh Circuit rejected 
298. See, e.g., Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 454 F.2d 363, 367 (7th Cir. 1971); 
Nuclear-Chicago Corp. v. Nuclear Data, Inc., 465 F.2d 428,430 (7th Cir. 1972); see Tele-
Controls, Inc. v. Ford Industries, Inc., 388 F.2d 48, 50 (7th Cir. 1967). In Burns v. Elrod, 
509 F.2d 1133 (7th Cir. 1975), affd on other grounds, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality deci-
sion), the Court evaluated only factors (1) and (2) in reversing the district judge's denial of 
a preliminary injunction. Id. at 1136. 
299. Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 454 F.2d 363,366 n.3 (7th Cir. 1971); Mytinger 
& Casselberry, Inc. v. Numanna Laboratories Corp., 215 F.2d 382, 385 (7th Cir. 1954) 
(although a diversity case, the court applied federal standards to the motion for interim 
relief). 
300. Nuclear-Chicago Corp. v. Nuclear Data, Inc., 465 F.2d 428 (7th Cir. 1972). 
The court relied on Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 274 U.S. 588 (1927), for 
the proposition that irreparable injury is the sine qua non of injunctive relief in the federal 
courts. Id. at 429 n.1. 
301. 545 F.2d 1096 (7th Cir. 1976). 
302. Id. at 1097. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. 
305. Id. For a discussion of the Fifth Circuit criteria, see text accompanying notes 
237-54. 
306. Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White Hydraulics, Inc., 715F.2d 348 (7th Cir. 1983), 
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 976 (1984); Wesley-Jessen Div. of Scheving Corp. v. Bausch & 
Lomb, Inc., 698 F.2d 862 (7th Cir. 1983); Machlett Laboratories, Inc., v. Techny Indus-
tries, Inc., 665 F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1981). 
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the plaintiffs argument that a showing of irreparable injury and a 
demonstration that the hardships favor the injunction precludes the 
need to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.307 In re-
jecting that assertion, the court indicated that the movant's burden of 
showing likely success could be lessened (but not eliminated alto-
gether) if she made a strong showing of injury absent the interim re-
lief.308 That is, the relationship between probability of success ot;1 the 
merits and a balance of hardships is inversely proportional: a greater 
showing on one factor lessens the showing needed on the other. 
The court of appeals confirmed this "sliding scale" approach in 
Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis. 309 Indeed the 
court went so far as to say that the movant could secure a preliminary 
injunction with a strong showing on the hardship factor even if the 
opposing party has a better chance of prevailing on the merits.310 The 
court appeared to return to the three-pronged standard for obtaining 
interim relief antedating the Fox Valley decision,311 without mention-
ing this decision. Unlike Fox Valley, the moving party under the tri-
partite standard need not make any showing regarding the "public 
interest. " 
In recent days, however, the Seventh Circuit has returned to the 
four-part test for interim relief articulated in Fox Valley.312 In some of 
307. Fox Valley, 545 F.2d at 1097-98. 
308. Id. at 1098. 
309. 694 F.2d 119, 123 (7th Cir. 1982). Accord, Vogel v. American Society of Ap-
praisers, 744 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1984); General Leaseways, Inc. v. National Truck 
Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 590 (7th Cir. 1984) (although Judge Posner acknowledged the 
four-part test announced in earlier Seventh Circuit cases, he nonetheless applied his own 
variation articulated in the Omega case); Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Services, 736 F.2d 
1153 (7th Cir. 1984); Jones v. Franzen, 697 F.2d 801, 804 (7th Cir. 1983) (Judge Posner 
authored the opinions in Omega, Jones, General Leaseways, and Vogel). In a very recent 
case, Judge Posner, recognizing that "the relevant case law is in disarray in both this and 
other circuits," sought to deal with these inconsistencies. Roland Machinery Co. v. 
Dresser Industries, Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 382 (7th Cir. 1984). He concluded, however, that 
"it is not possible to reconcile all the precedents, or even just all the ones in this circuit." 
Id. at 385. 
310. Omega, 694 F.2d at 123. 
311. Id. 
312. Libertarian Party oflndiana v. Packard, 741 F.2d 981, 984-85 (7th Cir. 1984); 
Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Services, 736 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir. 1984); Godinez v. Lane, 733 
F.2d 1250, 1257 (7th Cir. 1984); Hillhaven Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Health & 
Social Services, 733 F.2d 1224, 1225-26 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); SEC v. Sutter, 732 
F.2d 1294, 1301 (7th Cir. 1984); Technical Publishing Co. v. Lebhar-Friedman, Inc., 729 
F.2d 1136, 1138 (7th Cir. 1984); Shaffer v. Globe Protection, Inc., 721 F.2d 1121, 1123 (7th 
Cir. 1983); Alexander v. Chicago Park District, 709 F.2d 463, 469-70 (7th Cir. 1983); 
Signode Corp. v. Weld-Loc Systems, Inc., 700 F.2d 1108, 1111 (7th Cir. 1983). See gener-
ally, Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 382-85 (7th Cir. 
1984) (attempt to harmonize existing case law in the Seventh Circuit). 
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these recent decisions, the court has eroded the "sliding scale" ap-
proach by identifying the "reasonable likelihood" factor as "the 
threshold requirement."313 In such cases, the court first addressed the 
likely to succeed factor. 314 Having found that the movant had not met 
its burden on that point,31S it declined to review the other three ele-
ments of the test.316 Under the sliding scale approach of Omega, the 
court is obligated to address both the "reasonable likelihood" factor 
and the balance of hardships element since they bear an inverse rela-
tionship for purposes of interim relief.317 
J. Eighth Circuit 318 
The early decisions of the Eighth Circuit have played a significant 
role in the development of the modern standards for preliminary relief. 
For example, the Supreme Court relied entirely on Love v. Atchison, T. 
& S.F. Ry. Co. 319 in Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway,no and other circuits have 
equally cited Eighth Circuit decisions.321 In City of Newton v. Levis,322 
the court identified two elements for interlocutory relief: (1) the mo-
vant must raise questions of law or fact which are "grave and diffi-
cu1t;"323 and (2) the injury to the moving party will be "immediate, 
certain, and great"324 if the injunction is denied, while the harm to the 
313. Alexander v. Chicago Park District, 709 F.2d 463, 467 (7th Cir. 1983). Accord, 
Hillhaven Corp. v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Social Services, 733 F.2d 1224, 
1226 (7th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Technical Publishing Co. v. Lebhar-Friedman, Inc., 729 
F.2d 1136 (7th Cir. 1984). See O'Brien v. Town of Caledonia, 748 F.2d 403, 406 (7th Cir. 
1984) (reciting and applying the four factors without any reference to the sliding scale 
approach or the abuse of discretion standard on appeal). 
314. Alexander v. Chicago Park District, 709 F.2d 463,465 (7th Cir. 1983). 
315. Id. at 469. 
316. Id. at 469-70. 
317. Omega, 694 F.2d at 123. 
318. Congress created this court in 1891 when it established nine circuit courts of 
appeals. 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (commonly referred to as the Evarts Act or the Circuit Court 
of Appeals Act of 1891). 
319. Love v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 185 F. 321 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 220 
U.S. 618 (1911). 
320. 279 U.S. 813, 815 (1929) (per curiam). In discussing standards for preliminary 
injunctions, the Court used language which it drew almost verbatim from the Love 
decision. 
321. See, e.g., Missouri-Kansas-Texas Ry. Co. V. Brotherhood ofRy. & S.S. Clerks, 
188 F.2d 302, 305 (7th Cir. 1951). 
322. 79 F. 715 (8th Cir. 1897). 
323. Id. at 718. The court also used the phrase "serious or doubtful" to describe the 
quality of the questions presented for decision. Id. 
324. Id. The court also employed the words "irreparable," and "irremediable" to 
describe the nature of the injury to be proved. Id. 
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opposing party will be "comparatively small and insignificant"325 if 
the injunction is granted.326 The court also noted that any potential 
harm to parties because of the injunction could be prevented with a 
bond. 327 
As in other circuits, the ~arly cases are no longer followed. In 
1973 when the Eighth Circuit decided Minnesota Bearing Co. v. White 
Motor Corp., 328 a leading modern precedent, the court did not refer to 
any of its earlier decisions regarding preliminary injunctions. In that 
antitrust suit, the plaintiff challenged the defendant's termination of a 
distributorship agreement and setting of resale prices.329 Affirming 
the denial of a preliminary injunction, the court of appeals held that 
the moving party must show: (1) "substantial probability of success" 
on the merits; and (2) "irreparable injury" if the injunction is not 
granted.330 Furthermore, the court stated that the trial judge may 
consider whether the injunction will substantially injure other inter-
ested parties, and inflict harm on the public interest. 331 
Over the next five years, the court of appeals read Minnesota 
Bearing in two ways. One line of cases focused exclusively on the two 
principal factors: substantial probability of success and irreparable in-
jury.332 The other line relied primarily on those two factors, but noted 
that the court may take account of two optional factors: harm to 
other interested parties and to the public interest. 333 In 1978, the 
court complicated the matter in Fennell v. Butler. 334 In that suit to 
enjoin an ordinance to regulate massage parlors, the court of appeals, 
325. Id. The court also used the phrase "no substantial loss or injury" and "incon-
siderable" to describe the quantity of the harm to the opponent. Id. 
326. Accord Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago Great Western R. Co., 190 F.2d 
361,363 (8th Cir. 1951) (per curiam); Pratt v. Stout, 85 F.2d 172, 177 (8th Cir. 1936); Love 
v. Atchison, T & S.F. Ry. Co., 185 F. 321, 331-32 (8th Cir. 1911); Allison v. Corson, 88 F. 
581, 584 (8th Cir. 1898). 
327. Levis, 79 F. at 718. 
328. 470 F.2d 1323 (8th Cir. 1973). 
329. Id. at 1325. 
330. Id. at 1326. 
331. Id. 
332. E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Minnesota v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352, 365 (8th Cir. 
1977), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 978 (1977); American Train Dispatchers Assoc. v. Burling-
ton Northern, Inc., 552 F.2d 749, 755 (8th Cir. 1977); Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. 
H.K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388, 392 (8th Cir. 1976); Nebraska Dep't of Roads v. Tiemann, 
510 F.2d 466, 447 (8th Cir. 1975); Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense Comm. v. FBI, 
507 F.2d 1281, 1287 (8th Cir. 1974). 
333. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Minnesota, Inc. v. Citizens for Community Ac-
tion, 558 F.2d 861, 866 (8th Cir. 1977); Chicago Stadium Corp. v. Scallen, 530 F.2d 204, 
206-07 (8th Cir. 1976); American Home Investment Co. v. Bedel, 525 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th 
Cir. 1975). 
334. 570 F.2d 263 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 906 (1978). 
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in vacating a denial of preliminary relief, set forth the two factors em-
phasized in Minnesota Bearing,33S without any mention of the two 
"optional" factors. Then the court adopted an alternative test based 
on decisions in the Second336 and Ninth331 Circuits. Under this stan-
dard, the moving party need only show that its suit involves serious 
questions going to the merits, and a balance of hardships "decidedly" 
favoring the movant.338 
The appellate decisions following the Fennell opinion largely re-
flected the alternative tests for preliminary relief which it an-
nounced.339 In 1981, the court of appeals convened en banc "to 
clarify" the criteria for interim relief because "in recent years some 
misunderstanding of the standard has developed."340 In Dataphase 
Systems, Inc. v. c.L. Systems, Inc. ,341 the plaintiff, a new entrant into 
the field of computerized library circulation systems, accused the de-
fendant of committing antitrust violations and business tortS.342 The 
district court granted the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunc-
tion to restrain the defendant from disparaging its goods.343 It applied 
the less stringent of the alternative tests approved in Fennelf:344 seri-
ous questions going to the merits and a balance of hardships in the 
335. Id.at 264. 
336. See supra notes 142-73 and accompanying text. 
337. See infra notes 370-402 and accompanying text. 
338. Fennell, 570 F.2d at 264. At the time of the Fennell decision, the Second Cir-
cuit had already modified this two-part test by adding a third factor: irreparable injury. 
See Triebwasser & Katz v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 535 F.2d 1356, 1358 (2d Cir. 1976). 
Other than in Frejlach v. Butler, 573 F.2d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir. 1978), the Second Circuit 
modification was not followed in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Rittmiller v. Blex Oil, Inc., 
624 F.2d 857, 860 (8th Cir. 1980); Chromalloy American Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 
611 F.2d 240, 244 (8th Cir. 1979); Bio-Medicus, Inc. v. Shareholders Comm. in Opposition, 
608 F.2d 1155, 1162 (8th Cir. 1979). 
339. E.g., Minnesota Ass'n of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Minnesota Dep't of 
Public Welfare, 602 F.2d 150, 152 (8th Cir. 1979); Young v. Harris, 599 F.2d 870, 875-76 
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 993 (1979); Campbell "66" Express, Inc. V. Rundel, 
597 F.2d 125, 127 (8th Cir. 1979); Modem Controls, Inc. V. Andreakis, 578 F.2d 1264, 
1264 n.4 (8th Cir. 1978). 
340. Dataphase Systems, Inc. V. C.L. Systems, Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 112 (8th Cir. 
1981) (en banc). For additional commentary on this decision, see generally Note, Civil 
Procedure: Dataphase Systems, Inc. V. C.L Systems. Inc.: Preliminary Injunctions, 15 
CREIGHTON L. REv. 830 (1982). The reference to "recent years" once again ignores the 
earlier precedents dating back to 1897 which anticipated the "alternative test" discussed in 
Fennell, although the Court in Dataphase did casually cite to a few of its earlier opinions. 
Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 113-14. 
341. 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 
342. Id. at 111. 
343. Id. 
344. See supra note 338 and accompanying text. 
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plaintiff's favor. 345 It made no finding regarding irreparable injury or 
likelihood of success. 
In vacating the injunction, the court of appeals purported "to re-
affirm that there is a single 'test' or list of considerations to be used in 
every case" where an interlocutory injunction is sought. 346 In effect 
the court rejected the holding in Fennell and subsequent cases that 
alternative criteria are available to evaluate interim relief. In recon-
ciling the dual sets of standards, the Eighth Circuit adopted a four-
factor analysis with a sliding scale. In deciding motions for interlocu-
tory injunctions, the trial court is to consider: "(1) the threat of irrep-
arable harm to the movant; (2) the state of balance between this harm 
and the injury that granting the injunction will inflict on other parties 
litigant; (3) the probability that movant will succeed on the merits; and 
(4) the public interest."347 
With regard to the sliding scale variation, the court of appeals 
held that the moving party is not required to "prove a mathematical 
probability of success at trial. "348 This factor is to be weighed against 
the other three factors. If these other factors (the "equities") tip "de-
cidedly" in the movant's favor,349 then she need not show a probability 
of success on the merits.350 She need only raise "questions so serious 
and difficult as to call for more deliberate investigation."351 It appears 
that the court adopted the sliding scale approach, in part, to discour-
age the trial judges from delving too deeply into the merits on motions 
for preliminary injunctions, "an early stage" of the litigation. 352 In his 
concurring opinion, Judge Ross frankly recognized that the court was 
supplanting the two Fennell alternatives with a new "third test," 
which concededly includes elements of the other twO.353 
In the aftermath of the Dataphase decision, the court of appeals 
has not hewed to a consistent path although its goal in Dataphase was 
"to achieve a clear verbal formulation."354 The subsequent decisions 
have tracked several patterns. One category is composed of decisions 
in which the court has adhered fairly closely to the Dataphase analysis. 
In those cases, it has dutifully recited the four factors identified in the 
345. Dataphase, 640 F.2d at Ill. 
346. Id. at 112. 
347. Id. at 114. 
348. Id. at 1\3. 
349. Id. 
350. Id. 
351. Id. 
352. Id. 
353. Id. at 115 (Ross, J., concurring). 
354. Id. at 114. 
1984] PRELIMINAR Y INJUNCTIONS 219 
opinion and applied the probability element with the requisite degree 
of flexibility. 355 
But the decisions of the Eighth Circuit have not, by any means, 
adhered strictly to every precept set out in Dataphase. In some in-
stances, the court has affirmed lower court judgments by examining 
rather thoroughly some or all of the issues to be decided after a hear-
ing on the merits.356 This appears contrary to the language in 
Dataphase, discouraging such forays into the merits.357 Indeed in a 
recent case, the Eighth Circuit referred to the probability of success 
factor as "the flaw in the traditional test"358 because it allows (and 
indeed may require) the trial judge to determine, at a premature stage 
in the litigation, who will win on the merits.359 On motions for in-
terim relief, the court observed, trial judges "should avoid deciding 
with any degree of certainty who will succeed or not succeed."360 
A third pattern to emerge is that the court of appeals has tended 
to examine one or more, but not all, of the Dataphase factors. This 
approach seems contrary to Dataphase which stressed: "In balancing 
the equities no single factor is determinative."361 In Purex Corp. v. 
Local 618,362 for example, the court affirmed the denial of preliminary 
relief after concluding that the moving party was not likely to succeed 
on the merits.363 Similarly, in Roberts v. Van Buren Public Schools,364 
355. E.g., N.I.S. Corp. v. Swindle, 724 F.2d 707, 710 (8th Cir. 1984); Medtronic, Inc. 
v. Gibbons, 684 F.2d 565, 567 (8th Cir. 1982); Tuepker v. Farmers Home Admin., 684 
F.2d 550, 552 (8th Cir. 1982); Sperry Corp. v. City of Minneapolis, 680 F.2d 1234, 1237 
(8th Cir. 1982); Walker v. Lockhart, 678 F.2d 68, 70 (8th Cir. 1982); Jensen v. Dole, 677 
F.2d 678, 680 (8th Cir. 1982); Medtronic, Inc. v. Catalyst Research Corp., 664 F.2d 660, 
663 (8th Cir. 1981); ABA Distributors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 661 F.2d 712,714 (8th 
Cir. 1981); Monahan v. Nebraska, 645 F.2d 592, 598 (8th Cir. 1981). See McDonell v. 
Hunter, 746 F.2d 785, 787 (8th Cir. 1984) (recitation of the four factors without mention-
ing the flexible element); Tyler v. Black, 744 F.2d 610, 611 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984) (same). 
356. E.g., Roberts v. Van Buren Public Schools, 731 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1984); Ferry-
Morse Seed Co. v. Food Com, Inc., 729 F.2d 589 (8th Cir. 1984); Purex Corp. v. Local 
618, 705 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1983); Higbee v. Starr, 698 F.2d 945 (8th Cir. 1983); Chua 
Drua Cha v. Noat, 696 F.2d 594 (8th Cir. 1982); South Eastern Human Dev. Corp. v. 
Schweiker, 687 F.2d 1150 (8th Cir. 1982). The extended discussion of "state action" in 
Higbee is especially instructive since the concept of state action under the Fourteenth 
Amendment has troubled the Supreme Court at least since Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 
(1948), and has generated mountains of analyses. 
357. Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 113. 
358. O'Connor v. Peru State College, 728 F.2d 1001, 1002 (8th Cir. 1984). 
359. Id. 
360. Id. See also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Hovey, 726 F.2d 1286 
(8th Cir. 1984). 
361. Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 113. See also Tuepker v. Farmers Home Admin., 684 
F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1982), stating, "No single factor is determinative." Id. at 552. 
362. 705 F.2d 274 (8th Cir. 1983). 
363. Id. at 277. 
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the Eighth Circuit held that failure to establish irreparable injury 
alone is sufficient ground to deny the inerlocutory injunction,365 which 
is contrary to the Dataphase directive that "no single factor is determi-
native."366 Finally, in O'Connor v. Peru State College,367 the court de-
clined to discuss the probability of success factor at all since the 
balance of equities did not favor the moving party.368 Under 
Dataphase, it appears that a very strong showing of probable success 
on the merits can overcome a lesser showing on the other three 
factors. 369 
K. Ninth Circuit 370 
Relying in large measure on the "lost" Supreme Court precedent 
in Georgia v. Brailsford,371 the Ninth Circuit early stated a two-part 
test for preliminary relief. For such a motion to be granted, the mov-
ing party must show: (1) a probable right or a prima facie case on the 
merits; and (2) a probable danger or irreparable injury if the injunction 
is not granted. 372 Over the years, the test has evolved into the current, 
"traditional" criteria: (1) whether the moving party will suffer irrepa-
rable injury if the interim relief is denied; and (2) whether the moving 
party can demonstrate probable success on the merits.373 
In 1972, the court of appeals suggested that the alternative test 
for interlocutory relief, adopted by the Second Circuit in Hamilton 
Watch,374 would be available for litigants in the Ninth Circuit.375 In 
364. 731 F.2d 523 (8th Cir. 1984). Accord Harris v. United States, 745 F.2d 535, 536 
(8th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); Tenant Affairs Board v. Pierce, 693 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1982). 
365. Roberts, 731 F.2d at 526. 
366. Supra note 360. 
367. 728 F.2d 1001 (8th Cir. 1984). 
368. Id. at 1003. 
369. Concededly, in such instances, "the moving party faces a heavy burden of dem-
onstrating that he is likely to prevail on the merits." Dataphase, 640 F.2d at 113. 
Dataphase would seem to afford the movant the chance to meet that burden, while 
O'Connor appears to deny that opportunity. 
370. Congress created this court in 1891 when it established nine circuit courts of 
appeals. 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (commonly referred to as the Evarts Act or the Circuit Court 
of Appeals Act of 1891). 
371. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792); 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 415 (1793); 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) I 
(1794). 
372. E.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Earl, 82 F. 690, 691-92 (9th Cir. 1897); Jensen v. 
Norton, 64 F. 662,664 (9th Cir. 1894). 
373. E.g., Mayview Corp. v. Rodstein, 480 F.2d 714, 716 (9th Cir. 1973). 
374. Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 743 (2d Cir. 1953). 
375. Costandi v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc., 456 F.2d 941, 943 (9th 
Cir. 1972) (per curiam). The court did not refer to Burton v. Matanuska Valley Lines, 244 
F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1957), where the court applied the criteria of Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 
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Hamilton Watch, the Second Circuit held that preliminary relief could 
be granted if the moving party raises serious questions going to the 
merits and if the hardships tip decidedly for the movant. 376 In Cos-
tandi v. AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc. ,377 the court affirmed 
a grant of an interlocutory injunction because the balance of hardships 
tipped toward the movant. 378 In addition the court noted that, in light 
of Hamilton Watch, the moving party need not show a likelihood of 
success on the merits.379 
In 1975, the Ninth Circuit made it plain that it had adopted the 
two-pronged alternative test in Costandi. In Wm. Inglis & Sons Bak-
ing Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 380 the court recited the "alter-
native" test drawn from the Second Circuit precedents. The moving 
party may secure interim relief by showing either (1) prC'-Jable success 
on the merits and possible irreparable injury; or (2) that she has raised 
serious questions about her claims and the balance of hardships tips 
sharply in her favor. 381 Furthermore, in Inglis, the court of appeals 
recited what it has called the "traditional" test for interlocutory in-
junctions. To obtain such relief, the moving party bears the burden of 
demonstrating: (1) irreparable injury; (2) probability of success on the 
merits; (3) balancing of harms to both parties; and (4) the injunction 
will serve the public interest. 382 The court in Inglis did not make clear 
whether both the "traditional" test and the two-pronged "alternative" 
test would exist side-by-side. If so, then the litigant would, in effect, 
have three tests from which to choose. 
In 1978, the Ninth Circuit seemed to abandon its multi-track ap-
proach to interlocutory relief. In Benda v. Grand Lodge,383 the court 
recognized that its past precedents had applied both prongs of the al-
ternative test as independent standards for preliminary relief.384 But it 
also noted that recent decisions in other circuits had analyzed them as 
supra note 50, which could be read as the precursor of the alternative test of Hamilton 
Watch. 
376. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
377. 456 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) .. 
378. Id. at 943. The trial judge also imposed a $300,000 injunction bond on the 
successful movant, the defendant. 
379. Id. The court did not expressly use the "serious question" language of Hamil-
ton Watch, although the case may be read to adopt it implicitly. 
380. 526 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1975). 
381. Id. at 88. 
382. Id. at 87. In essence, the court added two other considerations to the two-
pronged, "traditional" test it had applied at least since 1894. See Jensen v. Norton, 64 F. 
662 (9th Cir. 1894). 
383. 584 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. dismissed, 441 U.S. 937 (1979). 
384. Id. at 314-15. 
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"merely extremes of a single continuum,"385 and not as two distinct 
and separate standards for evaluating interim relief. In merging the 
tests, the court focused on two considerations: the strength of the 
moving party's claims, and the nature of the potential injury to the 
respective parties depending on whether the injunction is granted or 
denied. 386 It made no reference to the "public interest" factor which 
had appeared in some formulations of the "traditional" test. More 
important, it made no reference to the "traditional"387 test at all, sug-
gesting strongly that it was now dead. 
In merging the two-prongs of the "alternative" test, the court 
stated that the two key elements bear an inverse relationship to each 
other. 388 If the balance of hardships tips decidedly towards the moving 
party, then she need not make a strong showing regarding the strength 
of her claims.389 If, on the other hand, the balance simply tips towards 
the movant, then a much stronger showing on the strength of her 
claims is necessary.390 However, no matter how severe the injury may 
be to the moving party if the injunction is denied, the "irreducible 
minimum" on the other factor is a "fair chance of success on the mer-
its" or the "questions must be serious enough to require litigation."391 
If the movant has no chance of succeeding on the merits, the injunc-
tion cannot be granted under any circumstances.392 Since, as the court 
stated, "the critical element . . . is the relative hardship to the par-
ties,"393 presumably the balance must always tip to some degree to-
wards the movant. 
Within four months of the merger affected in Benda, the Court of 
Appeals appeared to return, at least momentarily, to the multi-track 
system. In City of Anaheim v. Kleppe,394 the court noted that it had 
adopted a "continuum" approach in Benda and had stated the "tradi-
tional" test in Sierra Club. 395 Then the court applied both the tradi-
385. Id. at 315. 
386. Id. at 315-18. 
387. In truth, its past precedents had described the "traditional" test in at least three 
ways. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Earl, 82 F. 690 (9th Cir. 1897) (two factors); Sierra 
Club v. Hathaway, 579 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1978) (three factors); William Inglis & Sons 
Baking Co. v. ITI Continental Baking Co., 526 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1975) (four factors). 
388. Benda, 584 F.2d at 315. 
389. Id. 
390. Id. 
391. Id. at 315. 
392. Id. 
393. Id. 
394. 590 F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1978). 
395. Id. at 288 n.4. See Sierra Club v. Hathaway, 579 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1978). 
The court set out the traditional test as embracing three parts: (1) a strong likelihood of 
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tional and the "continuum" tests, concluding that the movant was not 
entitled to a preliminary injunction under either.396 Since Kleppe, the 
court has not adhered to any consistent pattern. In some cases, the 
court has been faithful to its holding in Benda, discussing and apply-
ing the continuum approach without reference to the traditional 
test.397 In other instances, it has followed Kleppe, applying both the 
traditional test and the Benda continuum. 398 
In a third category of cases, it has followed Inglis, applying the 
traditional test and the two-pronged alternative test.399 In a fourth 
category of decisions, the court has simply applied the two-pronged 
alternative test without any reference to the traditional test or the 
Benda continuum.400 To complicate the matter still further, the court 
in some recent cases has not mentioned the Benda continuum at all,401 
and has introduced the "public interest" factor into the two-pronged 
alternative test.402 The continued confusion and inconsistency in the 
Ninth Circuit are well illustrated by two cases decided within five days 
of each other in November, 1984. In those appeals, two separate 
panels applied two different tests for preliminary relief.403 
success on the merits; (2) a balance of irreparable harm favoring the movant; and (3) the 
injunction must serve the public interest. Sie"a Club, 579 F.2d at 1167. 
396. Kleppe, 590 F.2d at 288 n.4. 
397. E.g., Goldie's Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court of Cal., 739 F.2d 466.470 (9th 
Cir. 1984); Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984); Beltran v. Myers, 677 
F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1982). 
398. E.g., Aleknagik Natives Ltd. v. Andrus, 648 F.2d 496, 502-04 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(uses three-factor traditional test); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National 
Football League, 634 F.2d 1197, 1200-03 (9th Cir. 1980) (uses four-factor traditional test). 
399. E.g., American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1983). 
See Lydo Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Las Vegas, 745 F.2d 1211, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(recitation of the traditional test and the two-pronged alternative, but applying only one 
branch of the latter). 
400. E.g., Students of Cal. School for the Blind v. Honig, 736 F.2d 538,542 (9th Cir. 
1984); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1984); 
Sports Form, Inc. v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 686 F.2d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1982). See Lynch 
v. Rank, 747 F.2d 528, 534 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984). 
401. E.g., Students of Cal. School for the Blind v. Honig, 736 F.2d 538 (9th Cir. 
1984); Flynt Distributing Co. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1984); Apple Computer, 
Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984). 
402. E.g., Students of Cal. School for the Blind v. Honig, 736 F.2d 538, 542 (9th Cir. 
1984); Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1498 (9th Cir. 1984); American Motorcyclist 
Ass'n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962, 965 (9th Cir. 1983). But see Sports Form, Inc. v. United Press 
Int'l, Inc., 686 F.2d 750, 753 (9th Cir. 1982) (no mention of public interest factor while 
applying the alternative test). 
403. Compare Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. ABC, Inc., 747 F.2d 511, 515 (9th Cir. 
1984) (applying the "traditional" three-part test of Sie"a Club) with Lynch v. Rank, 747 
F.2d 528, 534 n.9 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying the two-pronged alternative test). 
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L. Tenth Circuit 404 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has not followed a consistent 
path in applying the governing standards for the issuance of prelimi-
nary injunctions. In early cases,405 it appeared to follow the criteria 
adopted by the Eighth Circuit in the Love case:406 (1) the questions 
presented in the suit are grave and difficult; and (2) the harm to the 
moving party is great and irreparable if the injunction is denied, while 
the harm to the opponent would be inconsiderable if the injunction is 
granted. An injunction bond may be used to protect the opposing 
party from injury which is more than "inconsiderable." On other oc-
casions, the court has applied a different two-part test: (1) a prima 
facie showing of reasonable probability of success on the merits; and 
(2) irreparable injury if the injunction is denied (apparently without 
any balancing of hardships to the opposing party).407 
The two lines of authority appeared to converge in Continental 
Oil Co. v. Frontier Refining CO.408 In that case, Frontier Refining sued 
to enjoin Continental Oil from violating the antitrust laws and for 
treble damages.409 Affirming the grant of interlocutory relief, the 
Tenth Circuit stated that a party seeking such an order must show 
either: (1) a prima facie case of reasonable probability of ultimate suc-
cess, and possible irreparable injury if the injunction is denied;410 or 
(2) a balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the movant's favor, and 
the presence of serious questions going to the merits of the contro-
404. Congress created the Tenth Circuit in 1929 when it split the Eighth Circuit into 
two circuits. 45 Stat. 1346 (1929). 
405. E.g., Morton Salt Co. v. City of South Hutchinson, 159 F.2d 897, 899-900 (10th 
Cir. 1947); see Allen W. Hinkel Dry Goods Co. v. Wichison Indus. Gas Co., 64 F.2d 881, 
884 (10th Cir. 1933); cf Goodpastor v. Oklahoma Gas & E1ec. Co., 291 F.2d 276 (10th Cir. 
1961); Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 52 F.2d 226 (D. Idaho 1931) (three-judge court). 
406. Love v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 185 F. 321, 331-32 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
220 U.S. 618 (1911). The Supreme Court cited Love with approval in Ohio Oil CO. V. 
Conway, 279 U.S. 813, 815 (1929) (per curiam), discussed supra note 50 and accompanying 
text. 
407. E.g., Crowther V. Seaborg, 415 F.2d 437, 439 (10th Cir. 1969) (the court uses 
"probable right" and "probable danger" language reminiscent of Justice Johnson's dissent-
ing opinion in Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 405 (1792)); accord Armstrong v. 
Maple Leaf Apartments, Ltd., 508 F.2d 518, 524-25 (10th Cir. 1974); Automated Market-
ing Systems, Inc. v. Martin, 467 F.2d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 1972). In Penn v. San Juan 
Hospital, Inc., 528 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1975), the court stated that the movant's showing 
of her right to relief on the merits must be "clear and unequivocal," placing a heavier 
burden on the moving party than earlier cases would indicate. Id. at 1185. 
408. 338 F.2d 780 (10th Cir. 1964) (per curiam). 
409. Id. at 781. 
410. Id. 
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versy.411 The decision in Continental Oil did not resolve the matter, 
however, as the court of appeals has not adhered uniformly to the 
alternative test formulation. In several subsequent cases, it has recited 
or applied only one branch of the Continental Oil standards.412 
With the law in need of clarity, the court of appeals in 1980 de-
cided Lundgrin v. Claytor.413 In that case, the plaintiff sought to en-
join the Secretary of the Navy from ordering him to active duty until 
he completed his residency.414 In discussing the standards for inter-
locutory relief, the court first noted the two factors stated in Sea-
borg :415 substantial likelihood of success on the merits416 and 
irreparable injury.417 This test, the court noted, had often been ex-
panded to include two other factors: a balance of harms favoring the 
moving party and the public interest.418 The Tenth Circuit then held 
that, if the moving party satisfies the three factors other than the sub-
stantial likelihood element, she could take advantage of the more lib-
eral criterion announced in Continental Oil.419 
In other words, once the movant has satisfied the irreparable in-
jury, balance of hardships, and public interest considerations, then the 
burden of showing substantial likelihood is lowered. In such in-
stances, the moving party need only show the dispute involves serious 
questions that are "fair ground for litigation."42o In applying these 
criteria to the facts before it, however, the court seemed to depart from 
these articulated standards. While agreeing with the district court 
that the moving party had failed to show a probability of success on 
411. Id. at 781-82. 
412. See supra note 351. 
413. 619 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1980). 
414. Id. at 61-62. 
415. Id. at 63. See supra note 351. 
416. In fact Sea borg had used the phrase "reasonable probability," not substantial 
likelihood. 
417. 619 F.2d at 63. Although earlier cases had spoken of "possible" irreparable 
injury, the court in Lundgrin insisted that the test was whether the moving party "will 
suffer" irreparable harm. Id. at 63. 
418. Id. For this expansion, the court cited cases in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, 
and two leading treatises on civil procedure. It did not, however, cite its own precedent, 
Associated Securities Corp. v. SEC, 283 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1960), in which it applied a 
similar four factor test on a motion to stay an administrative order pending appeal. Id. at 
774-75. 
419. Lundgrin, 619 F.2d at 63. When Continental Oil stated an alternative, two-
pronged test for preliminary relief, it did so independently of the probable success require-
ment. In assimilating part of the test into the four-factor standard, the court of appeals in 
Lundgrin ignored the independent nature of the Continental Oil alternative test. 
420. Lundgrin, 619 F.2d at 63. 
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the merits,421 the court never applied the more liberal "fair ground" 
standard. If the moving party has satisfied the other three factors, it 
may secure interim relief simply by raising serious questions that are 
fair ground for litigation.422 In applying facts to law, the court ig-
nored the legal principles it had just set down in the case. 
In decisions subsequent to Lundgrin, the Tenth Circuit has not 
adhered to it consistently. In some cases, the court has followed the 
analytical framework set out in Lundgrin.423 In other instances, it has 
reverted to the old two-factor approach to interlocutory relief: irrepa-
rable injury and substantial likelihood of success on the merits.424 In 
still other decisions, the Tenth Circuit has apparently applied the four-
factor test of Lundgrin without the liberalizing interpretation of the 
substantial likelihood of success factor.425 And in a fourth class of 
cases, the court appears to have followed the Lundgrin analysis with-
out mention of the public interest factor.426 
M. Eleventh Circuit 427 
In the first case to come before the newly created Eleventh Cir-
cuit, the court, sitting en banc, held that all the prior opinions of the 
former Fifth Circuit, handed down by close of business on September 
30, 1981, would be binding precedents in the new court of appeals.428 
Consequently, in the cases involving preliminary injunctions, the court 
has regularly relied on the earlier Fifth Circuit precedents, such as 
Canal Authority of State of Florida v. Callaway.429 Canal Authority 
established a four part standard: (1) a substantial430 likelihood the 
421. Id. at 65. 
422. Id. at 63. 
423. E.g., Otero Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Reserve Bank, 665 F.2d 275, 278 
(10th Cir. 1981). 
424. E.g., Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Cities Service Co., 715 F.2d 1425, 1432-33 (10th 
Cir. 1983); see Atchison, T & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 259 (10th Cir. 1981) 
(per curiam) (holding that where a statutory claim for relief is asserted, irreparable injury 
will be presumed once the movant demonstrates that the statute has been or will be 
violated). 
425. E.g., Vance v. Utah, 744 F.2d 750, 752 (10th Cir. 1984); GTE Corp. v. Wil-
liams, 731 F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir. 1984). 
426. E.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1375 
(10th Cir. 1981), cert. dismissed, 456 U.S. 1001 (1982). 
427. Congress created the Eleventh Circuit in 1980 when it split the Fifth Circuit 
into two circuits, effective October I, 1981. 94 Stat. 1994 (1980). 
428. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en bane). 
429. 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1974) (see supra note 233 and accompanying text). See, 
e.g., Harris Corp. v. National Iranian Radio and Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1353-54 (11th 
Cir. 1982); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. Donovan, 689 F.2d 950,956 (11th Cir. 1982). 
430. The court of appeals has stated that the use of the word "substantial" does not 
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moving party will prevail on the merits; (2) a substantial threat that 
she will suffer irreparable injury431 if the injunction is denied; (3) the 
harm to the movant outweighs any harm to the opposing party; and 
(4) the injunction, if granted, will not dis serve the public interest.432 
The court of appeals has followed the four-factor approach prob-
ably more rigidly than the other circuits which have adopted this 
methodology.433 Indeed it has applied the criteria to the point where, 
if the moving party has not established one of the four elements, the 
court will not review the showing on the other three.434 Because the 
court has insisted that the moving party demonstrate each of the four 
factors,435 it has implicitly rejected any "sliding scale" notion where a 
greater showing on one factor may offset a lesser showing on 
another.436 
Consequently, its discussion of the "substantial likelihood" factor 
has carried the Eleventh Circuit very deeply into the merits of the 
case,437 a reason advanced in other circuits for adopting the sliding 
scale approach. Under that approach, a lesser showing on the likeli-
hood of success factor is not fatal to interim relief if the moving party 
can make a greater showing on one or more of the other factors. If the 
movant makes a lesser showing on the likelihood factor, the courts 
need not intrude significantly, at such an early stage of the litigation, 
into the claims to be resolved at final hearing. In this respect the new 
add anything to the quantum of proof needed to show "likelihood of success on the mer-
its." Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber and Yacht Corp., 697 F.2d 1352, 1355-56 n.2 (11th 
Cir. 1983). 
431. As in other circuits, the court has stated that "irreparable injury" means not 
only that the moving party has no adequate damage remedy, Johnson v. United States 
Dep't of Agriculture, 734 F.2d 774, 789 (11 th Cir. 1984); Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 
1189 (11th Cir. 1983); Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber and Yacht Corp., 697 F.2d 1352, 
1357 (11th Cir. 1983), but also that she does not have an adequate remedy of any sort. 
United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1520 (llth Cir. 1983); United States v. 
Lambert, 695 F.2d 536, 539 (11th Cir. 1983). 
432. Donovan, supra note 76, at 956. See generally supra note 232. 
433. E.g., Johnson v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 734 F.2d 774, 781 (11th 
Cir. 1984); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Marsh, 721 F.2d 767, 786 (11th Cir. 1983); Cate v. 
Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1185 (lith Cir. 1983); Shatel Corp. v. Mao Ta Lumber and Yacht 
Corp., 697 F.2d l352, 1354-55 (11th Cir. 1983). 
434. E.g., United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1519 (11th Cir. 1983); 
United States v. Lambert, 695 F.2d 536, 540 (11th Cir. 1983). 
435. E.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. Marsh, 721 F.2d 767, 786 (11th Cir. 1983); 
Cate v. Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1185 (11th Cir. 1983). 
436. See discussion of sliding scale approach, supra notes 239-54 and accompanying 
text. 
437. E.g., Johnson v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 734 F.2d 774, 782-84 (11th 
Cir. 1984); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Marsh, 721 F.2d 767, 767 (11th Cir. 1983); Harris 
Corp. v. National Iranian Radio and Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 1982). 
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Eleventh Circuit has departed from the path pursued by its parent, the 
old Fifth Circuit.438 
IV. A MODEL FOR INTERLOCUTORY RELIEF 
A. Introduction 
This article will conclude with a suggested model addressing the 
deficiencies of current standards for issuance of interlocutory relief 
and proposing more sound criteria.439 As no~ed in the introduction, 
the proper focus should be whether the denial of interim relief will 
seriously erode or totally undermine the capacity of the court to for-
mulate an effective remedy after a hearing on the merits. Concentrat-
ing on that question, courts and litigants need not engage in lengthy 
and tedious arguments over what constitutes the status quo and how, 
if at all, it should be preserved. Consequently, the central concern 
should focus on the potential for irreversible harm which the non-
moving party may visit upon the movant if the injunction is denied. 
While this rationale may appear to be more protective of the authority 
of the court than the interests of the litigants, in fact, both of those 
concerns merge in adjudicating the request for interim relief. 
Because preserving the subject matter of the litigation is the focus 
of inquiry, the development of meaningful criteria to govern disposi-
tion of motions for interlocutory injunctions should reflect that objec-
tive. Over the years, English and American courts have identified 
several factors which have been used in various combinations to grant 
or deny such relief. These factors will be examined to determine 
whether they provide an adequate basis for a model. Among the many 
elements employed over the past 100 years, the relevant factors identi-
fied by courts and commentators can be distilled into four: (1) the 
strength of the moving party's claims; (2) the harm the parties will 
suffer if the relief is granted or denied; (3) the adequacy of the remedy, 
after a judgment on the merits, to compensate the ultimate winner for 
the harm endured because the interim relief was granted or denied; 
and (4) the impact the grant or denial of interim relief will have on 
persons who are not parties to the suit. 
438. See supra note 436. 
439. The reader may also wish to examine the helpful models discussed in two other 
articles on the subject: Castles, Interlocutory Injunctions in Flux: A Plea/or Uniformity, 34 
Bus. LAW. 1359 (1979), and Leubsdorf, Preliminary Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525 
(1978). There is some harmony, although not congruity, among the three models. 
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B. Injury to the Parties 
Since the focus is preserving the subject matter of the dispute un-
til final judgment, the principal concern should be the potential of the 
non-moving party, unrestrained by injunction during litigation, to 
harm irretrievably the movant's rights or interests. Most courts have 
used the phrase "irreparable injury" to describe the nature and quan-
tity of such harm. For example, where one spouse has asked doctors 
to remove life support systems from an ailing spouse, a suit by their 
children to enjoin preliminarily the removal should succeed since the 
action of the doctors will destroy the subject matter of the dispute. Or 
if a candidate for public office is challenging an election procedure 
which prevents her from timely filing the proper papers, suspending 
the procedure or the deadline would properly be the object of interim 
relief. Finally, if the non-moving party intends to transfer unique 
property beyond the reach of the court's process, temporary injunctive 
relief would be appropriate. 
Having identified the injury which the non-moving party may 
visit on the moving party absent the injunction, the court must then 
consider its capacity or ability to remedy that harm after final judg-
ment if the injunction is denied. Traditionally, this inquiry would 
center on the adequacy of the legal remedy, which meant compensa-
tion through money damages. But since the merger of law and equity 
and the development of other protective devices, the examination into 
the remedial powers of the court should be more expansive than sim-
ply asking whether the moving party's interim injury can be remedied 
with a money judgment. Indeed the federal courts have already begun 
to define an adequate remedy at final judgment as including relief 
available in law or equity, in state or federal court, or before an admin-
istrative agency. 
Furthermore, the range of remedial devices to protect the moving 
party from potential injury should encompass conditional denials of 
preliminary relief. A judge may deny the request for a temporary in-
junction, for example, on condition that the non-moving party post a 
bond, or take other action which will protect the subject matter of the 
suit without interim injunctive relief. In selected cases, the federal 
courts have included creative provisions in orders denying temporary 
injunctions, the effect of which is to protect the moving party from 
injury pending final resolution of the dispute. 
Up to this point, the assumption has been that only the moving 
party would be adversely affected by the judge's decision on the re-
quest for a temporary injunction. But suppose the grant of interim 
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relief would injure the non-moving party beyond some negligible or 
inconsiderable degree. In such instances, should the court issue the 
injunction notwithstanding the harm which may result to the opposing 
party? There are at least three possible responses to this circumstance. 
First, the court could simply deny the injunction once the non-moving 
party showed some threshold level of harm. This is not a satisfactory 
approach since it gives too little weight to the injury of the moving 
party, which may be enormous compared to the harm of the opposing 
party. 
Second, the relative injuries to the respective parties by the grant 
or denial of the injunction could be weighed, and appropriate action 
taken, depending on which way the balance tipped. If the balance tips 
toward the moving party, the injunction would be granted. If it tips 
toward the opposing party, the injunction would be denied. This "all 
or nothing" approach is too simplistic to provide a meaningful 
formula for interlocutory relief. Third, the courts could impose, as 
they now do, a requirement on the movant to demonstrate some level 
of strength to his claims for relief. The next section of the article ex-
amines this point. 
Fourth, the courts could, as many have in the past, impose condi-
tions on the moving party in exchange for the injunction. Posting 
bond, for example, is the most popular of the current devices used to 
protect the non-movant from potential harm pending final resolution 
of the dispute. Other creative solutions may also be available, such as 
ordering recoupment in public benefits cases. Since many public wel-
fare statutes currently provide for such recoupment, the court could 
use the statutory remedy as the basis for protecting the defendant's 
interests. Further, the court could impose conditions upon the non-
moving party by ordering a conditional denial of interim relief. This 
fourth response appears to be the most satisfactory solution to the 
problem, considering the substantial difficulties which inhere in the 
other three proposals. 
C. Strength of Movant's Claim 
Assuming the interlocutory injunction is necessary to preserve 
the subject matter of the lawsuit for final resolution, the question then 
arises whether the strength of the moving party's claim should be 
taken into account under any circumstances. On one level, it could be 
argued that no inquiry should be made into the merits on a motion for 
interlocutory relief. If the freedom of action granted to the non-mov-
ing party would effectively render meaningless any relief the moving 
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party would secure upon final judgment, the restrictions imposed 
through injunction are necessary to preserve the subject matter of the 
litigation, irrespective of the strength of the movant's claims. Nine-
teenth century English and American precedents permitted interim re-
lief based solely on the balance of hardships, and the grant of security 
to protect the rights of the non-moving party.440 
But if that is the case, the moving party could arguably obtain a 
preliminary injunction even if her claim is frivolous. The fear of a 
moving party securing interlocutory relief based on a totally meritless 
claim has probably animated the imposition of the criterion relating to 
the strength of the movant's claim. This factor has been phrased vari-
ously: a probability, a likelihood, or a possibility of success on the 
merits, or serious questions going to the merits. Even a preliminary 
inquiry into the merits presents immediate, practical difficulties. If the 
trial court must inquire into the claims of the moving party, it will 
inevitably address the merits of the dispute at least to some degree. 
Even though the standard may be phrased in terms of probability 
or likelihood of success on the merits (including the sliding scale varia-
tion), it may still take the court deeply into the substance of the con-
troversy. Judges are understandably reluctant to go down that path, 
in part, because the preliminary injunction hearing and the prepara-
tion for it are ordinarily abbreviated. For this reason, some federal 
courts have opted for the less intrusive "alternative test": whether the 
moving party has raised serious questions going to the merits. Despite 
these reservations, however, the federal appellate courts have fre-
quently addressed with some detail the merits of the controversy 
under the guise of reviewing a grant or denial of interlocutory relief. 
The impulse to avoid an early decision relating to the merits is 
grounded in several reasons. First, the speed with which hearings on 
preliminary injunctions are conducted precludes the parties from de-
veloping an adequate record for decision. If factual or legal issues, or 
both, are contested, the abbreviated, truncated, and expedited hearing, 
which is the hallmark of preliminary relief, is an inadequate mecha-
nism for making even preliminary judgments about the merits. If the 
strength of the movant's claim is to be fairly addressed, more time is 
necessary to develop a record than is usually available on motion for a 
temporary injunction. 
Second, once the court enters the merits of the case, even if it is 
440. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. See also Comment, Probability of 
Ultimate Success Held Unnecessary for Grant of Interlocutory Injunction, 71 COLUM. L. 
REV. 165 (1971). 
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only to determine "a probable outcome," the tendency is to explore 
the merits in much greater depth than anticipated. Numerous deci-
sions of courts of appeals, for example, while professing to explore 
only the likelihood of success, have actually delved into the merits in a 
very profound way.441 In many cases, it is difficult to see how the trial 
judge on remand could decide the merits any other way than as "prob-
ably" determined by the appellate court. 
Third, an early decision on the strength of the movant's claim 
may send the wrong message to the parties regarding the vitality of the 
suit. This is especially true if the courts, trial or appellate, gratuitously 
venture deeply into the merits of the cause. Such premature and im-
proper assessments of the merits may precipitate unnecessary conces-
sions by the losing party, and lead to settlements which otherwise 
would not occur. While few would oppose non-litigated resolution of 
controversies, it hardly serves the interests of justice to dispose of cases 
on records which are factually and legally incomplete. Such disposi-
tions may be the inevitable product of even low level and very prelimi-
nary evaluations of the strength of the movant's case. 
Fourth, entering into a discussion of the merits at an early stage 
of the litigation also places an additional burden on the federal courts 
of appeals. Since the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction is 
appealable as of right under 28 U.S.c. § 1292(a)(1), the appellate 
courts have a steady diet of appeals seeking review of such orders. 
Examining the strength of the movant's claims is frequently the most 
time-consuming part of the appellate process, from the standpoint 
both of the litigants and the court. The parties, of course, often have 
an avid interest in addressing the merits at great length in their briefs 
and oral arguments. Once the parties have pursued that course, it is 
difficult for the appellate court to resist the temptatioI). to examine the 
merits equally in depth in the decision on the appeal from a grant or 
denial of interlocutory relief. 
Fifth, to avoid these difficulties, some courts, as noted earlier, 
have lowered the threshold showing necessary with respect to the 
strength of the movant's claim.442 The reduced standard is usually 
phrased in terms of whether the movant has raised "serious questions" 
going to the merits of the suit.443 While this criterion arguably pre-
vents the judges from entering into lengthy and frequently dispositive 
discussions of the merits, it is doubtful whether it serves the purpose of 
441. See supra notes 120, 193, 220, 253 and 356. 
442. See supra notes 348-53 and accompanying text. 
443. Id. 
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weeding out frivolous claims. A good lawyer can make even the most 
meritless claim appear, at least at first blush, to raise serious questions 
of law or fact. When opposing lawyers have little time to investigate 
either the factual or legal frivolity of a suit, a low threshold hardly 
eliminates the claim devoid of merit. 
Finally, it may be argued that the party against whom the frivo-
lous claim is asserted has no recourse when the lack of merit is re-
vealed after discovery and further proceedings leading toward a 
judgment on the merits. As noted above, the losing, non-moving party 
will have the protection of a bond or other terms which the judge may 
impose as conditions for issuing the preliminary injunction. In addi-
tion, the federal rules provide numerous procedural protections to the 
litigant who believes an ill-founded claim has been made against him. 
These protections include motions for judgment on the pleadings, for 
summary judgment, and for an expedited hearing on the merits. In 
appropriate cases, the party opposing the injunction may also move to 
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction if the claim is totally 
frivolous or utterly devoid of any merit.444 
Furthermore, Rule 11 of the federal rules provides additional 
safeguards to protect the party victimized by an interlocutory injunc-
tion based on a frivolous claim.445 Under the 1983 amendments to the 
rule, the court may impose sanctions, including attorney fees and 
other expenses of litigation, upon a party that files a "pleading, mo-
tion, or other paper" without first making a "reasonable inquiry" into 
its factual or legal basis, or "for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay .... "446 This protection may be 
especially important where a motion for a temporary injunction seeks 
to stall a corporate takeover to buy time for management. 
D. Combining Interim and Final Relief 
It may be that some cases are ready for disposition on the merits 
at the time of the preliminary injunction hearing. Some older prece-
dents appear to permit interim relief based solely upon a showing of a 
clear right or title.447 Thus a temporary injunction might be secured if 
the movant could make that showing in the brief period of time in 
which motions for such relief are ordinarily prepared for and exhibited 
to the court. These actions may include suits where the facts are un-
444. See. e.g., Hagans v. Lavine. 415 U.S. 528, 537 (1974). 
445. FED. R. elV. P. II. 
446. Id. 
447. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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contested or where the parties are otherwise agreeable to presenting 
their full cases on short notice. If that is the situation, the simple solu-
tion is to move under Rule 65(a)(2) to consolidate the hearing on the 
motion for interim relief with a trial on the merits. Either the parties 
or the court may initiate such consolidation, which may be ordered 
before or after the hearing begins. 
E. Interests of Non-Parties 
Before summarizing the model offered here, one other matter 
should be addressed. On various occasions, the Supreme Court and 
the courts of appeals have included the "public interest" or the inter-
ests of non-parties, or both, as factors to be evaluated on motion for 
interim relief.448 Few of these courts, however, have been consistent in 
requiring consideration of those concerns, nor have they fully ex-
plained why public interest or harm to others should be examined on 
any particular occasion. Furthermore, this public interest or the harm 
to others factor is rarely determinative in granting or denying interim 
relief, although the Supreme Court has stated that it could be decisive. 
In the vast majority of cases, however, it is simply a "make weight" 
for granting or denying the interlocutory injunction. 
More fundamentally, however, evaluating harm to the public in-
terest generally or to other non-litigants seems unavailing, too amor-
phous, and usually unproductive. For example, in an antitrust suit 
where the plaintiff seeks preliminary relief, it would appear that the 
public interest is as much served by the grant as by the denial of the 
injunction. If it is granted, the order may assist the enforcement of the 
antitrust statutes. If it is denied, the interests of the nation in a vigor-
ous and healthy system of free enterprise may be advanced. In either 
case, the "public interest" may benefit. Therefore the public interest 
or harm to others factor should be eliminated from consideration, ex-
cept in two instances: class actions and suits involving governmental 
parties. 
In these two categories of cases, the named parties are obligated 
to represent the interests of unnamed or absent persons whose injuries 
should be considered as if they were active litigants. In such instances, 
it is appropriate to align their interests with named parties. In class 
action suits, the question then arises whether the moving party must 
secure class certification before obtaining class-wide preliminary relief. 
If class certification can be accomplished simultaneously with the 
hearing for the interlocutory injunction, it should be done. But many 
448. See supra notes 69, 88, 238 and 304. 
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times that will prove difficult or impossible for the same reasons that 
the merits or the strength of the movant's claims should not be ad-
dressed prematurely. In such instances, the moving party may secure 
preliminary relief for the "class" upon a proper showing of injury to 
the unnamed parties. 
With regard to suits where the government is a party, the prob-
lem is more complicated. If the government (local, state, or federal) is 
a party seeking to enforce claims (usually, but not always, as a plain-
tifi), then the evaluation of the harm to the government can be under-
taken in the same manner as in a class action suit. For example, if the 
Secretary of Labor brought suit to enforce the Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, the Secretary's injury would be equated with the 
harm to the workers adversely affected by the alleged violation. When 
the government is placed in the role of opposing or resisting claims 
(usually as a defendant), the injury may be more difficult to assess, but 
it still can be done. First, in many instances, the injury can be quanti-
fied. For example, granting preliminary relief to restore social security 
benefits will cost the government money. That is a measurable 
amount of injury. Second, where the injury cannot be quantified, the 
court should try to evaluate the nature of the intangible, yet real injury 
to the "governmental interest." But the court should avoid abstract 
assessments based on the "public interest." 
F. Summary of the Model 
In summation, a five step approach is recommended to govern the 
disposition of motions for preliminary relief. The district judge 
should: (1) determine whether the non-moving party intends or is 
likely to take action which will injure the moving party; (2) if so, de-
termine whether that injury is of such a nature that the court cannot 
provide an adequate remedy after a trial on the merits of the case; 
(3) if irremediable injury is likely, determine whether the issuance of 
interim relief will cause the non-moving party more than negligible 
harm; (4) if so, consider whether protective devices (e.g., bonds or 
other terms and conditions) are available which, if imposed on either 
or both parties, will reduce to a negligible level the anticipated harm 
without the need for preliminary relief; and (5) if not, issue the injunc-
tion, requiring the moving party to post a bond or to take other steps 
to protect the non-moving party while the injunction is in force. Fi-
nally, if the case is ready for final disposition at the time of the request 
for interlocutory relief, the court should consolidate the preliminary 
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hearing with the trial on the merits and dispose of the entire case in 
one step. 
The solution put forward here is closely related to the notion of 
interim relief articulated and applied in some 19th century English 
and American decisions on temporary injunctions.449 Furthermore, 
except for eliminating any evaluation of the strength of the movant's 
claims, the model suggested here is similar to the standards discussed 
by the Supreme Court in Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway450 and Mayo v. Lake-
land Highlands Canning Co., 451 decisions which concededly do not 
number among the most well known precedents in the history of the 
Court. Nonetheless those precedents, upon which this model is based, 
deserve serious scrutiny and reconsideration. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The survey undertaken in this article shows that the Supreme 
Court and the courts of appeals have not articulated or applied consis-
tent criteria for preliminary injunctive relief. Their decisions have de-
scribed a sinuous path through primary standards, alternative tests, 
and sliding scale variations. Part of the difficulty may be .because the 
Supreme Court has not taken a firm hand in resolving conflicts be-
tween and among the circuits on critical issues involving interlocutory 
injunctions. In addition while the courts of appeals make reference to 
each others' opinions, they have not demonstrated a desire to achieve 
uniformity in their approaches to interim relief. In some cases, the 
non-uniformity is intra-circuit as well as inter-circuit. As the Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently observed, "the relevant case 
law is in disarray in both this and other circuits."452 
Because there are so many currently applicable tests and varia-
tions, a moving party asserting the same facts and legal principles in 
different circuits could easily secure different results on motions for 
preliminary relief. While non-uniformity of decisions may serve a cre-
ative purpose in the short run, over time it tends to breed disrespect 
for and discontent of the law and advance the perception that judicial 
decisionmaking is largely arbitrary. Furthermore from a practical 
perspective, non-uniformity, especially of the intra-circuit variety, 
tends to undermine the goal of predictability which is vital for lawyer 
449. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
450. See discussion and citation, supra note 50. 
451. 309 U.S. 310 (1940). 
452. Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 382 (7th Cir. 
1984). 
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and client in ordering their affairs to conform with established legal 
norms. If the principles are uncertain, both counseling and compli-
ance become chancy at best. 
